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Plant Closings
The Problem and Current Policy
In the 25 years immediately following World War n, the United States 
economy experienced moderate industrial and regional restructuring. 
The decline of the manufacturing sector and the movement of capital 
and population from parts of the North to most of the South and West 
took place amidst vibrant national economic growth and relative cyclical 
stability, and, consequently, went unnoticed in most parts of the coun 
try. In the last 18 years, these trends have accelerated. Not only is 
restructuring now occurring more rapidly than in previous decades, but 
it is taking place in an environment of weaker national growth and greater 
cyclical instability. In this context, it is not surprising that the loss of 
manufacturing jobs and the decline of many of the older industrialized 
regions have caught the attention of policy makers and academics, and 
that issues surrounding worker displacement have risen near the top 
of the domestic policy agenda. More and more often, manufacturing 
workers seem to be the victims of plant closings and permanent layoffs 
in regions and industries where employment opportunities are limited.
The aggregate numbers show that in recent years, job loss in some 
locations and industries has been significant. Between 1981 and 1986, 
the manufacturing sector lost 1.2 million jobs. This decline was not 
shared equally by all regions and industries. During the same period, 
for example, the Mid-Atlantic region lost 0.6 million jobs, while the 
East South Central gained 16,000 and the Mountain states gained 31,000 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1985 and 1988). There were also struc 
tural changes within manufacturing, with the skill-extensive, high-wage 
industries experiencing the largest employment losses. The steel industry 
lost almost 230,000 jobs; at the same time, office and computing
1
2 The Problem and Current Policy
machine manufacturing gained 94,000. While manufacturing employ 
ment declined in the U.S., the service sector grew by 4.5 million jobs 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1982-83 and 1988).
Large overall employment losses in manufacturing hide the fact that 
a far larger number of jobs were lost and workers displaced. For ex 
ample, with the net loss of 1.2 million manufacturing jobs, estimates 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics are that approximately 2.6 
million manufacturing workers, with previously stable work histories, 
were involuntarily and permanently laid off between 1981 and 1986 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1986).
These permanent job losses can be traumatic for the individuals af 
fected. Numerous studies have documented the psychological and finan 
cial costs of displacement and have found that the consequences can 
be devastating for individuals and communities. Many victims of plant 
closures and mass layoffs experience prolonged periods of unemploy 
ment, and, if they find new jobs, they often accept a dramatic cut in 
their standard of living. Medical studies have shown that dislocated 
workers exhibit rates of anomie, depression, alcoholism, heart disease 
and suicide that far exceed the rates in the general population. The prob 
lems are particularly acute for many older dislocated workers because 
they have had a stable work history (and consequently have rusty job 
search skills) and a high-paying job and comfortable life style which 
cannot be duplicated. Furthermore, they are less geographically mobile 
and often are perceived by employers as being less retrainable than 
younger workers (Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman 1981). Communities can 
also face difficult adjustments after a plant closing or mass layoff. When 
a large employer closes or downsizes, local governments can be hit with 
a declining tax base, a rising tax burden, and reductions in the quality 
of services.
The purpose of this study is to look behind net employment changes 
to (1) examine the relationship between regional employment shifts and 
plant closures, and (2) draw the implications of that relationship for 
displaced worker policy. More specifically, this study explores four 
questions.
  Is regional economic restructuring responsible for high rates of plant 
closures and permanent layoffs in the less competitive regions?
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  What are the characteristics of the enterprises most likely to close? 
Does a plant's age, size, or status as a headquarters, independent, branch, 
or subsidiary affect the probability of a closure?
  To what extent do adverse local economic conditions, such as high 
wages, utility costs, and taxes; a unionized labor force; or shrinking 
local market influence the probability a plant will close?
  Do workers displaced in an expanding local labor market experience 
large postdisplacement financial losses, or is economic dislocation a 
problem specific to the Rust Belt economies? 
The intention of this study is both to increase our conceptual under 
standing of the process of economic decline and job loss, and to con 
tribute to the ongoing debate on displaced worker policy.
Plant Closures and the Dynamics of Regional Change
In regional economics and regional planning literature, plant closures 
are widely believed to be both cause and consequence of industrial 
restructuring. When an industry shifts location, high rates of plant 
closures in the less competitive region are assumed to coincide with 
high start-ups in the low-cost or higher-revenue regions (see for exam 
ple, Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Markusen 1985; Mansfield 1985). 
Underlying causes of employment shifts to the South and West, or the 
so-called Sun Belt, are changes in regional production costs, 
technological change within industries, growing union strength among 
regional workforces, intensified industrial competition, and declining 
local markets.
Changes in relative regional production costs can alter the least-cost 
location calculus for an industry. For example, the slowdown in Euro 
pean immigration into New England in the 1920s caused the price of 
unskilled labor to rise in the northern states. Southern and southwestern 
locations, with abundant low-skilled labor from rural areas, became more 
attractive to assembly line manufacturing. Second, technological change 
in an industry's production process can free many industries to seek 
lower input costs in new locations. For example, with the development 
of steam power in the 1830s, the textile industry was no longer tied 
to the inland rivers of New England, and many firms relocated toward
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the coast and the South to cut labor costs. Third, restructuring may also 
be capitalists' response to growing militancy or organization on the part 
of labor (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Storper and Walker 1984). Firms 
may close branches, relocate operations and open new plants in the non 
union areas as a strategy for keeping in check labor's demand for higher 
wages and other benefits. Fourth, intensifying international competi 
tion is cutting into the profit margins of many domestic companies, for 
cing them to take new cost-cutting measures. One such measure may 
be a move to lower-cost production sites. Markusen (1985) argues per 
suasively that the steel industry would have decentralized earlier, to 
be near markets and to reduce transportation costs, if not for the in 
dustry's oligopolist structure, market power, and high profits. Prior 
to foreign competition, the steel industry did not have an incentive to 
tighten costs. Finally, the loss in local markets has led to the regional 
shift of market-oriented manufacturing out of the Frost Belt.
Manufacturing industries in the process of decentralizing are generally 
beyond their earliest stages of product development, and are consequently 
no longer anchored to a region-specific, specialized labor force. If not 
tied to a natural resource, they are free to relocate, and if they operate 
in a competitive environment, they have the incentive to seek out their 
most profitable location.
In order to understand the process of regional employment shifts and 
its relationship to plant closures, this study examines the components 
of employment change in three decentralizing industries, metalwork- 
ing machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicles. These in 
dustries are intended to be representative of many manufacturing in 
dustries shifting out of the northern states to the South and West.
The components of employment change include plant start-ups, clos 
ings, relocations and net on-site expansions. At the outset, there were 
three possible findings.
(1) Industry plant closure rates and rates of worker disloca 
tion are highest in the regions where the industry is exhibiting 
the greatest decline.
(2) Dislocation occurs at even rates in all regions of the coun 
try, but worker displacement is not a problem in growing 
regions because new jobs absorb the laid-off workers.
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(3) Displacement occurs evenly in all regions, but workers 
do not move easily into new firms. Consequently, displaced 
workers are forced to accept dramatic losses in income, even 
in growing regions.
In the first and second cases, worker displacement is an issue confined 
primarily to declining economies. In the third instance, worker displace 
ment is a national concern.
The findings support case 3 above, with two reservations. First, in 
industries experiencing dramatic declines in employment and where plant 
start-up rates are already low, as with motor vehicles, permanent layoffs 
appear to be highest in the declining regions. In other words, case 1 
applies. The second exception is that the youngest, best-educated, white 
and female workers displaced in labor markets exhibiting strong employ 
ment growth appear to make the transition to a new job with relatively 
small or no income losses. In other words, for these workers, case 2 
applies.
Current Public Policy to Assist Displaced Workers
Policymakers have acknowledged the high costs of job loss for the 
stable worker, but a coherent federal policy is still in the formative stages. 
At present, there are four policies which address some aspects of the 
displaced worker problem: import protections for selected domestic in 
dustries, Trade Adjustment Assistance, the Job Training Partnership 
Act, and plant closing legislation.
The U.S. restricts imports of a number of commodities, with the ex 
plicit purpose of protecting domestic jobs in those industries. At pres 
ent, textiles, apparel, some leather products, steel, large motorcycles, 
and small trucks are protected by import duties, voluntary restraints, 
or import quotas. Several additional industries are protected by anti 
dumping duties, including semiconductors and steel. An antidumping 
case can be brought when foreign producers are found to either sell 
their product in U.S. markets at a lower price than they charge at home 
or sell their product in U.S. markets below cost. Trade protection is 
the only major policy in force that attempts to slow structural shifts and
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inhibit job loss, and even this policy has become less common with time 
(Goldstein 1986). Increasingly, uncompetitive industries are forced to 
improve the quality of their product, cut costs, or experience major 
revenue losses that lead to employment declines. The emphasis of 
displaced worker policy has switched away from protecting jobs through 
trade restraints to providing some adjustment assistance for workers 
after layoff.
One such policy and a second form of assistance to displaced workers 
is Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). TAA provides supplemental 
financial assistance and a small amount of job search and relocation 
assistance to workers who lose their job as a result of the liberalization 
of trade. The legislation states that TAA is to be made available to 
workers when imports "contributed importantly" to their separation. 
The justification for this assistance, which supplements unemployment 
insurance, is that it will reduce political resistance to trade liberaliza 
tion and provide partial income maintenance to the workers who face 
the greatest barriers to reemployment. Because of questions about the 
equity of TAA, and findings that many recipients are later reemployed 
by the same company, there is growing congressional pressure to phase 
out TAA and shift additional resources to the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA Title HI), the third program to assist displaced workers.
JTPA Title III makes aid available to all dislocated workers, not just 
those affected by trade. These funds are flexible, but the most com 
mon uses are to set up plant-based job search and training assistance. 
The Reagan administration has voiced support for this program, and 
Congress increased funding from $223 million in 1985 to $287 million 
in fiscal year 1988. JTPA's performance evaluations noted delays in 
getting the money to a closing plant, shortages in funds for hard hit 
areas, and lack of knowledge about the program on the part of displac 
ed workers (U.S. Congress 1986).
A fourth set of policies to assist displaced workers falls in the category 
of plant closing legislation. This legislation has focused on assisting 
all workers affected by plant closures. Presumably, the legislation ex 
cludes workers who lose their jobs through cutbacks, because a layoff 
is clearly permanent when a plant closes, while it is not easy to deter 
mine whether layoffs from a continuing plant are permanent or cyclical.
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The proposed legislation has been designed to both minimize the per 
sonal losses and community costs of plant closures and to reallocate 
the social costs of displacement to those responsible for the layoff 
decision.
In some states, protections for workers have already been adopted. 
Maine and Wisconsin have enacted legislation requiring employers to 
give workers 60 days notice before a merger, liquidation, relocation, 
or plant closure. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland and 
Delaware have passed laws to promote employee ownership, and Califor 
nia, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have passed 
laws providing loans and/or loan guarantees and technical assistance 
for worker buyouts of closing plants (Rosen, Klein, and Young 1986, 
pp. 253-254). Other states have introduced, but not enacted, bills to 
require prenotification or to assist workers in buying out their closing 
plant.
Legislation to shift some of the burden of large scale job losses from 
workers to firms has also been introduced at the national level. In 1974, 
Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota and Congressman William Ford 
of Michigan introduced the National Employment Priorities Act (NEPA). 
This original bill died in committee, and was unsuccessfully reintroduced 
in an altered form every year until 1984. The major components of these 
bills provided for employee prenotification of a closing, severance pay 
to separated workers, grants and loans to failing businesses under some 
circumstances, and economic redevelopment assistance to local govern 
ments. In response to strong industry opposition and the bill's failure 
to get out of committee, Congressman Ford, along with Congressman 
Conte of Massachusetts, introduced a new bill in 1985 as a stopgap 
measure. This bill required that workers be given 90 days advance notice 
of a closing for plants with 50 or more employees, and was designed 
to aid displaced workers until a blue ribbon commission could evaluate 
the need for a more comprehensive bill. This last initiative was nar 
rowly defeated on the floor of the House.
In response to a request from Congress, Secretary of Labor William 
Brock established an economic adjustment and worker dislocation 
taskforce, made up of representatives of industry, government and 
academia. The taskforce's January 1987 recommendations call for a
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merger of the JTPA and TAA programs into a Worker Adjustment 
Assistance Program, with additional spending for job search, training, 
and cash assistance. The taskforce could not agree on a law requiring 
mandatory prenotification of a closing for displaced workers and 
communities.
In 1988, Congress again introduced displaced worker legislation. This 
time it passed both Houses as part of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill. 
This bill included $900 million for worker retraining, continuation of 
TAA, and 60 days advance notice of a closing for firms with 100 
employees or more. In mid-1988, President Reagan vetoed the bill. 
While the House of Representatives mustered enough votes to over 
ride the veto, an override failed in the Senate.
In contrast to the U.S. experience, the largest industrialized coun 
tries outside of the United States have already instituted some benefits 
for displaced workers. In Sweden, Great Britain, and West Germany, 
corporations are legally obligated to give advance notice before a clos 
ing and to negotiate the closing with their employee unions or workers' 
councils. The extent of other protections, such as severance payments, 
varies by country (U.S. Congress 1983, pp. 113-163).
In the United States, most structural adjustments are allowed to take 
place with little public sector intervention, leaving workers to bear a 
substantial share of the costs. In part, our reluctance to adopt a coherent 
and successful policy to deal with displaced workers can be attributed 
to a conservative political trend, but the effort to implement displace 
ment legislation has also been hampered by a lack of understanding about 
the relationship between plant closures and economic growth, about the 
causes of plant closings, and ultimately about the most efficient and 
effective way to help displaced workers. This study attempts to address 
these issues.
Organization and Major Findings
The study is organized into five additional chapters. Chapter 2 
describes the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data, used to carry out the 
analysis in chapters 3 and 4. This data set includes establishment level
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information for the years 1973, 1975, 1979, and 1982 for three in 
dustries, metal working machinery, electronic components, and motor 
vehicles. From these data, we can estimate regional and central city- 
suburban employment changes, subdivided by plant closures, start-ups, 
relocations, and on-site contractions and expansions. Chapter 2 explores 
the reliability and shortcomings of these data.
Chapter 3 examines the hypothesis that plant closures within industries 
are more frequent events in the economies where the industry exhibits 
the greatest decline. The chapter begins by describing the regional 
distribution of employment and employment trends for metalworking 
machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicles. All three in 
dustries are decentralizing from the industrialized North to the Sun Belt 
states. Metalworking machinery and motor vehicles are also decentraliz 
ing within regions, whereas electronic components employment is grow 
ing fastest in central cities. Regional employment shifts are analyzed 
by their components of growth, and finally the chapter tests whether, 
holding establishment characteristics constant, a plant is more likely 
to close in declining than in growing economies.
Four points characterize the process of regional restructuring for the 
three industries. (1) Employment shifts to the Sun Belt are not explain 
ed by relatively high rates of plant closures in the Frost Belt, but by 
high rates of job creation in the Sun Belt and, to a limited extent, by 
plant migrations from the Frost Belt to the Sun Belt. This same pattern 
also holds for intraregionals shifts in employment. Plant closure rates 
are relatively even across central city, suburb, and nonmetropolitan areas, 
and uneven rates of growth are explained by spatial variations in job 
creation through plant start-ups and expansions. (2) After holding con 
stant a plant's status as a branch, subsidiary, headquarters or indepen 
dent, and its size, there is no evidence that plant closure rates vary by 
location. (3) In the metalworking machinery and electronic components 
industries, the number of displaced workers is substantially higher in 
the older, industrialized states only because these industries are con 
centrated in those states, not because of higher closure rates. (4) There 
is some evidence for the 1975-79 period, in the motor vehicle industry 
only, that job loss through plant closures was greater in regions with 
greater industry decline. These results suggest that industrial decline
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may initially take the form of falling rates of job creation, which fail 
to compensate for losses occurring through an average rate of plant 
closures (as was found for the metalworking and electronic components 
industries). When an industry's rate of job creation is already very low, 
industrial decline is furthered by a rising rate of job loss through plant 
shutdowns.
Chapter 4 examines the hypothesis that high wages, utility costs, and 
taxes, relatively large increases in wages and utility costs, a unionized 
labor force, degree of import penetration, and/or shrinking market de 
mand are responsible for plant closures. While some evidence from the 
metalworking machinery industry shows that the relocation of 
establishments is more likely out of unionized states than nonunion states, 
we find no evidence that the variables commonly believed to affect plant 
closures do, in fact, have an impact. Instead, plant closure decisions 
appear to reflect the strategies and idiosyncracies of individual firms.
The limited cross-industry results are similar. There is no evidence 
that plant closure rates are higher in slow-growth than in expanding 
industries. The only variable to consistently influence the probability 
a plant will close is the plant's status as a subsidiary or branch. Branch 
plants and subsidiaries are between 8 and 32 percent more likely to close 
than headquarters or single plant operations.
Even with equal rates of plant closures, and, for metalworking 
machinery and electronic components, permanent job loss in all regions 
of the country, worker displacement may still be a regional problem, 
specific to the economies where new job creation is not sufficiently strong 
to absorb workers laid off by plant closures and permanent layoffs. The 
analysis in chapter 5 relies on a January 1984 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
survey of displaced workers to identify the labor market conditions under 
which displacement is a problem. Specifically, we test the hypothesis 
that worker displacement is still primarily a problem concentrated in 
declining economies, because workers laid off in labor markets with 
high rates of job creation successfully make the transition to a new job.
Chapter 5 argues that workers displaced in economies where the in 
dustry of displacement is growing are unemployed shorter periods of 
time and with smaller financial losses than workers displaced in areas 
where their industry of displacement is declining; that many displaced
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workers do not move easily into growing industries after displacement; 
and that many workers, especially those who are older and less educated, 
experience large reductions in living standards after displacement, even 
when they are displaced in a growing local labor market. We therefore 
conclude that worker displacement is a national issue, especially for 
older, less educated workers, and not a concern specific to the Rust 
Belt economies.
These findings indicate that the commonly accepted view of the causes 
of worker displacement is inaccurate and the problems of worker 
displacement, so evident in the Frost Belt region, are not simply a con 
sequence of regional and industrial restructuring. A worker is as likely 
to be displaced in a growing region as in a declining region, and for 
the industries studied, as likely to be displaced from a declining as a 
growing industry. Structural shifts are, however, responsible for the 
increasingly high costs of displacement. Many displaced workers do 
not move easily into new occupations and industries and as a conse 
quence regional realignments mean that the new, compatible jobs are 
frequently in the wrong location. Furthermore, industrial shifts mean 
that the skill requirements of newly created jobs do not match those 
of many displaced workers. The reemployment barriers are, therefore, 
particularly severe for workers displaced from shrinking industries in 
stagnating or declining economies.
Chapter 6 explores several policy options for both national 
policymakers and local economic development officials and argues for 
increased federal support to assist in the local takeovers of closing branch 
plants and subsidiaries, and for financial and adjustment assistance, 
especially for older, less educated displaced workers. The study's find 
ings argue against industrial policy as a means of slowing the pace of 
worker dislocation, and against concessions in wages, utility bills, and 
taxes as a strategy for retaining local jobs.
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The Dun and Bradstreet Data
The Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data underlie the analysis in chapters 
3 and 4. Chapter 2 examines the reliability of these data by comparing 
D&B's employment estimates with those of other sources and by 
evaluating the ways in which the data may bias estimates of plant clos 
ings, worker displacement, and employment growth due to start-ups, 
relocations, and on-site contractions and expansions.
In its role as a credit-rating company, Dun and Bradstreet collects 
and maintains information on approximately 6 million establishments. 
This data base, called the Dun's Market Identifiers (DMI) file, includes 
a Dun's number assigned to each business establishment; the establish 
ment's business address; the number of employees at that location; the 
business's major Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) at the 4-digit 
level; and the establishment's status as an independent, headquarters, 
branch, or subsidiary.
The Urban Institute obtained a subset of the Dun and Bradstreet file 
that included all establishments listing either SIC 354 (metalworking 
machinery), SIC 367 (electronic components), or SIC 371 (motor 
vehicles) as primary, secondary, or tertiary lines of business. To per 
mit an analysis of employment changes over time, the above data were 
obtained for the peak year of 1973, the recession year of 1975, the peak 
year of 1979 and the recession year of 1982. The sample includes data 
on 27,014 distinct establishments in SIC category 354, 14,067 
establishments in SIC category 367, and 11,909 establishments in SIC 
category 371.
These three industries were selected for a number of reasons. First, 
their growth rates vary. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 
Employment and Earnings, motor vehicles is a stagnant industry, with 
an annual average rate of employment growth over the 1973-79 period 
of 0.9 percent. Metalworking machinery is an average-growth industry,
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exhibiting a 2.2 percent average annual growth rate, and electronic com 
ponents is a fast-growth industry, with a growth rate of 4.7 percent over 
the same period. For purposes of comparison, total manufacturing 
employment grew from 1973 to 1979 at an annual average growth rate 
of 2.4 percent.
A second reason for selecting these industries is that all three are decen 
tralizing from the industrialized northern states to the Sun Belt. Conse 
quently, we could use the data to examine the process of regional decline.
Third, there is at least anecdotal evidence of a large number of clos 
ings among them.
Fourth, the three industries were selected to provide a variety of in 
dustry structures. Motor vehicle employment is concentrated in a few 
large companies, while metalworking machinery employment, in con 
trast, is dispersed among many relatively small producers.
Fifth, metalworking machinery and electronic components were 
selected because the establishments in these industries are reasonably 
well-represented in all of the major census regions of the U.S. (Each 
region's share of national employment in the three industries is shown 
in table 3.1 in chapter 3.)
A final reason for this selection of industries is that motor vehicles 
and machine tools represent basic industries, whereas electronic com 
ponents is considered part of the high technology sector. These cross- 
industry differences are more likely to capture variations in plant closure 
behavior and to permit generalizations from three to many industries.
Creating the Data Set
In order to estimate plant closing rates and employment losses due 
to plant closings, as well as employment changes due to start-ups, reloca 
tions, and expansions or contractions, the four D&B files were merged 
to create histories for each establishment.
Information from the City Reference File (CRF) of the Bureau of 
the Census was then added to the merged D&B file. The CRF assigns 
place descriptions to zip code areas. Thus, each establishment located 
in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) was noted as having
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a central city or suburban location. The 1977 Census definition of a 
central city is used here and includes the largest city in an SMSA. One 
or two additional cities may be identified as a central city on the basis 
of the following criteria (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1979, p. 25).
1. The additional city or cities must have a population of one-third 
or more of that of the largest city and a minimum population of 
25,000; or
2. The additional city or cities must have at least 250,000 inhabitants. 
The DMI file records an SMSA code for each establishment, thus allow 
ing us to determine whether a firm is located in or outside an SMSA. 
Suburbs, for this study, are defined as the area within an SMSA as noted 
by the DMI file and outside a central city, as noted by the CRF. The 
1977 boundaries are used throughout this study, in order to maintain 
consistency in geographical comparisons.
Coverage
The D&B data are expected to provide reasonably complete coverage 
for all types of establishments in the manufacturing sector except branch 
plants. D&B collects these data for credit rating reference, and 
branches are unlikely to require a credit rating independent from the 
owning company. Thus D&B has been less assiduous in recording in 
formation for branch plants than for headquarters or single-plant firms.
There are two ways that this underreporting of branch plants has been 
handled by other users. The two major users of the D&B DMI file, 
to date, are David Birch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
and Armington, Odle, and Harris of the Brookings Institution. Both 
groups worked with the complete data set, including all industries. For 
headquarters, the data set includes the total number of employees in 
the company and the total number of employees at that site. For single- 
plant firms (independents), the two numbers are the same, and for 
branches the record includes only the number of employees at that site. 
The Brookings team accounted for the underreporting of 
branches by assuming the employment totals for the whole company, 
found in the headquarters record, were accurate. They then created
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"imputed" records for missing branches. The MIT group, on the other 
hand, assumed the establishment level data were accurate.
We followed the MIT group's approach because the industry of the 
headquarters is not a good proxy for the industry of the missing branch 
es. Jacobson (1985) offers further support for our approach. In a com 
parison of establishment level data between the D&B file for Texas and 
the Texas unemployment insurance file, he found underreporting of bran 
ches by D&B not to be a serious problem. In addition, the Brookings 
group's method of "imputing" branches overestimates employment in 
the U.S. because foreign branches of domestic firms are included in 
the total.
Even though employment totals may underestimate branch plant 
employment, the D&B data set captures 100 percent of each industry's 
employment in all regions, with one or two exceptions. Table 2.1 com 
pares total regional employment estimates from the D&B data base with 
total employment as estimated by the Census of Manufactures. The 
employment estimates from both data sources include only those 
establishments that regard each respective industry as their first line 
of business. The ratios shown in table 2.1 are employment totals as 
estimated by D&B, divided by totals as counted by the Census for 1982. 
The ratios are disaggregated by region to detect the existence of any 
regional biases in the undercounting of employment.
For metal working machinery and motor vehicles, the D&B data 
estimates are higher than those of the Census of Manufactures. One 
reason to expect lower Census than D&B estimates is that the figures 
from the former source are aggregated from state data, and the total 
for several states is suppressed to avoid the disclosure of information 
about a single firm. For other states, a range of numbers rather than 
an actual figure is given. When this was the case, we took the mid 
point of the range. The D&B data are not subject to the disclosure restric 
tions of government data sources, and thus may give a more complete 
count of employment totals. Because of the high coverage, the D&B 
data are treated in several parts of this study as a population total, rather 
than as a sample.
The D&B data have several advantages over other data sources. First, 
establishment level data permit growth rates to be partitioned into the
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components of growth, including start-ups, closings, expansions and 
contractions, and migration. As mentioned above, the D&B data on 
individual establishments are publicly available and confidentiality is 
not an issue. Second, businesses have a commercial interest in providing 
accurate information, and consequently are likely to take more care in 
providing data to D&B than to the U.S. government. In spite of these 
advantages, the data base has a number of shortcomings, which are ad 
dressed in the remainder of this chapter.
Table 2.1
Ratio of Employment Totals from Dun and Bradstreet 
















































SOURCES: Numerator=total employment as estimated from the Dun and Bradstreet File, 1982.
Denominator=total employment from U.S. Census, Census of Manufactures, Geographic Area
Series, State Books, 1982.
New England: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.
Mid-Atlantic: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
East North Central: Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
West North Central: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and
Kansas. 
South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 
East South Central: Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Mississippi. 
West South Central: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.
Mountain: Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. 
Pacific: California, Oregon, and Washington.
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Problems in Estimating Plant Closings 
with the D&B Data
As with any data set, especially one not intended for research, there 
are a number of shortcomings. One shortcoming of the DMI file is that 
not all establishments are interviewed every year. The data sets acquired 
from D&B are as they existed on December 31, 1973, December 31, 
1975, December 31, 1979, and July 28, 1982, and not all firms were 
interviewed during the year of the tape's date. Fortunately, the D&B 
file records the date of establishment interview so that a distribution 
of interview dates could be calculated. The tables were calculated by 
region, so as to detect any regional biases in the updating of 
establishments. The table for metal working machinery for 1975 is shown 
as table 2.2. The 1979 and 1982 results and other industry results are 
similar (see Rowland 1983). We report the 1975 results because they 
are the earliest year for which we have the survey date for each establish 
ment. Since D&B has attempted to improve the accuracy of the data 
over time, these are reported as baseline estimates. In general, we find 
no regional bias and, furthermore, that about 80 percent of all 
establishments are updated in a year. Only about 6 percent of the records 
are more than two years out of date.
Table 2.2 
Percent of Interviews Taken in and Prior to 1975
As Recorded on the 1975 D&B Tape





























































SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1975.
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The failure to update records may bias the plant closing estimates 
downwards. Outdated records are probably inactive firms which have 
done little or no borrowing in the capital market, and we suspect that 
many of them are out of business. Birch and the MIT group treated 
outdated records as open and left them in the file. The Brookings group 
took into account that some of the records may have been closures and 
dropped out-of-date records from their analysis.
To estimate the extent to which outdated records are closings, we 
attempted to track down all of the Maryland records that were more 
than one year out-of-date, using both the telephone directories and the 
Maryland Directory of Manufactures. As stated above, the percentage, 
and therefore the number, of outdated records is relatively small. The 
percent of incorrect records is shown in table 2.3.
Table 2.3 shows, for example, there were only five metal working 
machinery establishments in Maryland more than two years out-of-date 
in the 1982 D&B file. The November 1982 and 1984 phone books and 
the Maryland Directory of Manufactures gave no evidence that four of 
the five companies were still operating, resulting in an error rate of 
80 percent. For metalworking machinery records that were one to two 
years out-of-date, 29 percent of the 14 establishments appeared to be 
closed. The remaining 71 percent had a current phone number and ad 
dress. Clearly, the error rate is higher for the more dated records.
Also shown in table 2.3 is the employment error rate. There were 
15 employees in the five establishments outdated by more than two years; 
73 percent of those jobs were incorrectly recorded as still in existence. 
The employment error rate is much lower among establishments one 
to two years out-of-date. These numbers indicate that small 
establishments are more likely to have outdated records in the D&B 
file. According to the Maryland phone book and the Maryland Direc 
tory of Manufactures, all of the out-of-date records that appeared to 
be closed were independents. The few branch plants in the outdated 
group were all still in existence.
A second shortcoming of the data base that affects the accuracy of 
plant closing estimates is that from time to time, D&B purges out-of- 
date records on establishments they believe to be closed. D&B sends 
first class letters to each inactive establishment requiring information
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of their status. When no response is received, D&B assumes the 
establishment is closed and retires its Dun's number. Some of these 
eliminated records might actually have been moves rather than clos 
ings, and the establishment might never have received D&B's letter.
Table 2.3
Percent of Inaccurately Recorded Establishments 














ESTAB .80 .29 .39 0 .35
(5) (14) (31) (3) (34)
EMPLOY .73 .002 .31
(15) (3090) (662)
Electronic Components
ESTAB .88 .17 .30 .19 .27
(8) (12) (50) (16) (66)





















SOURCES: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file; Maryland Phone Directories, November 1979, Oc 
tober 1982, October 1983; and the Maryland Directory of Manufactures, Department of Economic 
and Community Development, Annapolis, MD, 1977/78, 1979/80, 1981/82, and 1983/84.
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The MIT and Brookings researchers also recognized this problem, 
but dealt with it in different ways. Birch's group at MIT assumed that 
the removed firms were still operating and included them in their employ 
ment counts. The Brookings group assumed the removed firms were, 
in fact, closings.
To determine the extent to which purged firms were movers, we again 
took all the establishments that D&B recorded in Maryland as closing 
and attempted to track them down through the phone directories and 
the Maryland Directory of Manufactures. A substantial number of 
establishments were found to be operating after D&B dropped them 
from the file (table 2.3). Most of the still operating establishments had 
changed location, with only 2 out of 113 operating at the same address 
recorded in the D&B file. Unfortunately, the error rate for both 
establishments and employment is high, ranging from 23 to 35 percent 
for establishments and 31 to 55 percent for employment.
We disaggregated these error rates by independents and branch plants 
and found a higher error rate for independents than for branch plants 
(table 2.3). Because it is possible that a branch could close and other 
branches of the same company still show up in the Maryland phone 
book or Directory of Manufactures, we made phone calls to branches 
registered by D&B as closed that had a listing in one of the directories. 
The error rate in table 2.3 reflects all corrections due to the closing 
of one branch of a company and the continued operation of sister 
branches.
The very high error rate is handled in two ways. In the analyses that 
rely on aggregate totals, such as regional totals, we keep the outdated 
records in the file to cancel some of the error caused by attributing a 
closed status to some establishments still in operation. If Maryland is 
typical of the rest of the nation, the net effect should be a slight 
overestimate of establishment closings and a larger overestimate of 
employment lost in plant closings.
In the analysis (in chapters 3 and 4) based on individual observations, 
the focus is on establishments rather than employment. The error rate 
for establishments is below that for employment. In addition, we at 
tempt to avoid some of the biases caused by errors in the data by 
separating branches and independents, since the error rate for branch 
plants is relatively low. As shown in table 2.3, there were only three
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branches in all three industries that were incorrectly recorded as clos 
ings, and there were no branches whose records were more than two 
years out-of-date and who were closed. The errors among both the out- 
of-date records and relocations recorded as closings are concentrated 
in single-plant operations.
Attributing a closed status to some proportion of movers may give 
the data a regional bias. Movers are most likely to be growing enter 
prises that move to obtain more space. Since growing establishments 
are most likely to be located in growing regions, the plant closing rates 
in growing regions may be overestimated more than the rates in slow- 
growth regions. Potential biases are discussed in more detail in the results 
sections of chapters 3 and 4.
A third factor that may affect closing rates is a change in legal status. 
D&B's procedure is for acquired establishments to keep the same Dun's 
number. We did not find any evidence to suggest that recently acquired 
firms were given new Dun's numbers and thus recorded as a closing 
and an opening. We therefore assumed that retired numbers were in 
fact closings.
A fourth problem that might affect estimates of displaced workers, 
as well as estimates of employment gains or losses due to start-ups, 
relocations, or expansions and contractions is coding errors in the 
employment numbers. In the original D&B tape, the number of 
employees was coded as YXXX, where Y is the number of zeros to 
be attached to XXX. Any error in coding Y could easily distort employ 
ment values by thousands of employees. To check for such errors, a 
listing of all establishments that experienced employment changes of 
1,500 employees or greater between any two years was printed out. 
There were 1,779 establishments that fell into this category in all three 
industries. These cases were reviewed by hand to check for coding er 
rors. In some cases the change looked plausible. In one establishment, 
for example, employment went from 7,500 to 6,000. Such cases were 
left unchanged.
There were, however, cases where coding errors were obvious. For 
example, one establishment was recorded as having 300,000 employees 
in 1975, and 151 employees in 1979. The 1975 value was changed to 
300. The number of cases where similar errors were detected and records
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revised was 5 cases for SIC 354, 17 for SIC 367, and 16 for SIC 371. 
Where errors were not obvious, the original numbers were left 
unchanged.
To determine the accuracy of estimates of displaced workers from 
the D&B data, estimates from this source were compared to the estimates 
derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of Displaced Workers 
from January 1984. The comparisons are shown in table 2.4. While 
the time spans of the two data sets do not precisely overlap, the figures 
are annualized to facilitate comparisons. The D&B estimates cover the 
period December 1979 to July 1982. The CPS estimates cover the period 
January 1979 to January 1984.
Table 2.4
Comparison of Estimates of Displaced Workers
























































SOURCES: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1979 and 1982 and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplement on Displaced Workers, January 1984.
a. Includes workers displaced due to plant closings or a relocation out of state, covers the years
December 1979 to July 1982.
b. Includes workers displaced due to either plant closings or the failure of a self-operated business,
January 1979 to January 1984.
  Sample too small to provide estimates.
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Data for electronic components are not included in table 2.4 because 
the CPS data do not have an equivalent industrial category. It should 
be noted that the CPS counts are derived from a sample, which is less 
accurate in instances where the total population is small, such as for 
metal working machinery employment in the West North Central, East 
North Central, and Mountain states. As indicated above, the D&B data 
tend to overestimate closures. Therefore, the D&B estimates on the 
number of displaced workers were expected to be higher than those 
of the BLS, which is often, but not always, the case. Another reason 
D&B estimates were expected to exceed those of the BLS is that if a 
worker intended to retire or quit at the same time his or her job was 
eliminated by a plant closure, a job lost would not represent a displac 
ed worker in the BLS data but would be included in the D&B estimates. 
Given the differences in the ways the two data sets were assembled, 
in the dates of their coverage, and between definitions of jobs lost and 
displacement, the results are reasonably close and suggest that results 
derived from the D&B data will be meaningful.
Problems in Estimating Start-Ups 
and Relocations With the D&B Data
In spite of the problems outlined above, the closing estimates from 
the D&B file are expected to be more reliable than the start-up estimates. 
Dun and Bradstreet are constantly expanding their coverage of 
establishments, especially branch plants, but they do not give a date 
of start-up for branch plants. Therefore, it is not possible to determine 
whether a branch added to the file is actually a birth or the addition 
of a previously existing but unrecorded establishment. A date of incep 
tion is reported for headquarters and independents.
The MIT group and the Brookings group approached this problem 
in different ways. Brookings assumed that all branches added to the 
file were in fact new start-ups. The only exception to this rule occurred 
when a newly listed headquarters was added to the file. Then all of its 
branches were also assumed to be new listings rather than births. The 
MIT group, on the other hand, used statistics on employment in
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multiplant enterprises for 1967 to 1977 to estimate the likely level of 
employment change due to actual branch births in the 1978-80 period. 
This procedure led to estimates of branch births that were less than half 
of the estimates of Brookings. Both procedures are problematic. Clearly, 
Brookings includes as births many branches already in existence. The 
MIT approach does not take into account the cyclical sensitivity of birth 
rates.
The estimation of start-ups is further complicated by a serious under 
reporting of new firm start-ups. It can be several years before a new 
plant is included in the D&B file. Brookings adjusted for this short 
coming by accepting any newly listed nonbranch business that was 
established up to five years prior to inclusion in the file as a 1978-80 
start-up. To estimate nonbranch births, Birch and the MIT group 
estimated the rate at which D&B absorbed start-ups over the period 1967 
to 1980. The MIT team then calculated "absorption factors" by which 
recorded births must be multiplied in order to estimate actual births in 
the "real world." Different absorption factors were calculated for the 
five major industry groups and for different time intervals. This pro 
cedure probably leads to start-up estimates that are too high, due to 
the implicit assumption that D&B promptness in recording births has 
not improved between 1969 and 1980 and the employment in recorded 
births is the same as that in unrecorded births. 1
Our adjustment to account for underreported start-ups and the inability 
to distinguish between branch start-ups and the addition of a previous 
ly existing branch to the file differs from both of the above approaches. 
We estimated employment growth rates for the periods 1973-75, 
1975-79, and 1979-82 from the D&B data set. To calculate these growth 
rates we included only those firms that registered a date of birth be 
tween 1973-75, 1975-79, or 1979-82, respectively. All other 
establishments that were added to the file over the three periods were 
ignored. These employment growth rates were then compared with 
employment growth in each industry as estimated for the same time 
period by Employment and Earnings. We then assumed that any dif 
ferences between the two growth rates were due to the underreporting 
of births by the D&B file.
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This procedure is based on two assumptions. First, the DMI file cap 
tures the same percentage of start-ups in all locations of the U.S. and 
during all phases of the business cycle. Second, the divergence between 
the D&B and Employment and Earnings estimates are solely due to 
unreported start-ups. Using this procedure, we estimate that D&B cap 
tures approximately 1 out of 7 new jobs in start-ups in the metalwork- 
ing machinery industry, 1 out of 11 new jobs in start-ups in the elec 
tronic components industry, and 100 percent of new jobs in start-ups 
in the motor vehicle industry. It seems reasonable to find greater coverage 
of new start-ups for the slower-growing industries since there are fewer 
births in those industries to capture.
Another problem arose in attempting to identify each establishment 
as having either a central city or suburban location. The post office is 
constantly dividing zip code areas and creating new zip codes. For the 
zip codes created after 1977, there were no matching location identifiers 
in the 1977 CRF. Since the majority of these new zip codes were out 
side SMSAs, the problem was not as serious as it might have been. 
Out of 32,253 records in 1982, there were 204 establishments located 
within SMSAs whose zip codes did not have matches in the CRF. These 
establishments were eliminated from the central city/suburban analysis. 
The number of cases in this category is sufficiently small (0.6 percent 
of all establishments in SMSAs) that the elimination of these cases should 
not distort the results.
A further difficulty arose in attempting to identify intrametropolitan 
movers. One problem with the DMI data is that many addresses are 
not legitimate street addresses. Birch (1979, p. 17) estimated that, for 
all industries, about 20 percent of addresses were illegitimate. They 
were names of office buildings, industrial parks, shopping plazas, or 
street intersections. In other cases, addresses were abbreviated in one 
year and not in another; for example, Skyline Rd was reported as the 
address for one firm in 1975 and Skyline Road was reported in 1979. 
Due to both of these problems, in combination with misspellings, the 
matching of street addresses to determine movers was impossible. For 
this reason we decided to match zip codes rather than addresses to iden 
tify intrametropolitan movers. Two problems arose. First, firms occa 
sionally use the zip code of the nearest post office rather than the code
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of the location of their facility. This creates a city bias in identifying 
the location of establishments. Second, as mentioned above, zip code 
boundaries changed over time. Consequently, it was difficult to deter 
mine whether an establishment was a mover or whether its zip code 
was redefined. This second problem was resolved through an editing 
process carried out as follows.
According to the post office, when changes are made in a geographical 
area's zip code, only the last two numbers of the zip code are affected. 
In order to distinguish between an actual move and a redefinition of 
zip codes, a list of firms for which the last two digits changed during 
interim years and whose addresses were not the same was printed out. 
Many nonmovers were included in this file. For example, in 1975 Jephco 
Manufacturing had a zip code of 74135. In 1979 the code was 74112. 
The address for Jephco Manufacturing was recorded as 3704 E 56th 
St. in 1975 and 3704 E 56 St. in 1979. This establishment is clearly 
operating in the same location. Establishments such as Jephco were 
remerged with the file and flagged as nonmovers.
An exception to zip code changes affecting only the final two digits 
occurred in 1980. During that year, the post office revised the last three 
or four digits of a number of zip codes. Establishments affected by these 
changes were accurately recorded as nonmovers.
Clearly, the use of zip codes arbitrarily includes some short moves 
in the mover file and excludes others, but this should not have a substan 
tial effect on the results. The study will analyze central city to subur 
ban moves, SMSA to nonmetropolitan moves and interregional moves. 
The number of establishments moving within a zip code district and 
yet changing type of geographical place should be very small.
A final bias of the data is that it probably underestimates relocations. 
Many companies, especially larger multiplant firms, often change loca 
tion by setting up a branch in a new location at the same time they phase 
out an obsolete plant. Capital equipment at the old site may deteriorate 
as cash flows generated at that plant are shifted to finance the new plant. 
When the new plant is well-established, and/or the older plant is no 
longer profitable, the company finally closes the latter down. While 
this process may be considered a relocation or "runaway shop," it is 
counted by D&B as a start-up at the new plant and a closing of the old.
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Summary
The Dun and Bradstreet establishment data were not assembled for 
academic research and therefore are flawed in several respects. In spite 
of the shortcomings identified above, however, it remains the most com 
plete data source for identifying spatial patterns of plant closings and 
worker displacement. An understanding of the problems and biases of 
the data permits a more careful interpretation of the results that follow 
in chapters 3 and 4.
NOTE
1. See Johnson and Storey (1985) for a good discussion of the differences between the MIT and 
Brookings adjustments to the D&B data.
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Spatial Patterns of Plant Closings, 
Job Dissolution, and Economic Growth
Chapter 3 uses the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data to examine the 
hypothesis that business closings and worker displacement are more 
frequent events in slow-growth than fast-growth economies. The fac 
tors that discourage the start-up of new firms and branch plants, and 
lead to economic stagnation or decline, are also expected to accelerate 
job dissolution. Relatively low regional profit rates caused by high local 
wages, a unionized labor force, and high utility costs have been found 
to discourage regional investment (Engle 1974; Carlton 1979; Schmenner 
1982; Rowland 1985; and Harris 1986). These same factors should also 
depress relative profit levels in existing establishments, leading to above- 
average rates of plant closures, runaway shops,and shrinkage in on 
going enterprises.
The hypothesis is tested by (1) comparing regional rates of plant clos 
ings with rates of local employment growth, and (2) determining whether 
plants are more likely to close in the slow-growth regions, when plant 
age, status, and size are held constant.
Chapter 3 is divided into five sections. The first section describes 
the regional distribution of employment along with regional employ 
ment shifts. The second section presents rates of employment growth 
for metal working machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicles 
by regional and metropolitan/nonmetropolitan economies, and examines 
the extent to which high rates of plant closure are responsible for 
economic decline. This section also considers the remaining components 
of growth (start-ups, relocations, and expansions or contractions) and 
their role in explaining geographic differences in employment growth. 
The third section examines the relationship between economic growth 
and rates of job loss due to plant closings, relocations, and contrac 
tions. The fourth section presents regional estimates of the number of
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displaced workers, and the final section reports the results of logit models 
testing the impact of regional location on the probability a plant will 
close, holding constant the plant's size, age, and status as a headquarters, 
independent, branch, or subsidiary.
As stated in chapter 2, we use data on three 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Code industries, metal working machinery (SIC 354), electronic com 
ponents (SIC 367), and motor vehicles (SIC 371). By disaggregating 
the data to three specific industries rather than all manufacturing, we 
avoid some of the complications caused by regional differences in in 
dustrial composition. For example, closing rates could be high in a region 
because all industries close at high rates there, or because of that region's 
dependence on industries with high closing rates. We are particularly 
interested in examining how closure rates vary across regions within 
a single industry. To provide background to the analyses that follow, 
the first portion of this chapter describes the spatial distribution of 
employment in the three industries studied and their regional employ 
ment shifts.
Regional Employment Distribution and Trends
Table 3.1 shows the distribution and shift of national employment 
between 1973 and 1979 for metal working machinery, electronic com 
ponents, and motor vehicles. The 1973-79 growth rate was selected 
because both 1973 and 1979 were peak years in the national business 
cycle. The use of a peak-to-peak growth rate reduces biases in cross- 
space comparisons caused by variations in subnational business cycles 
(see for example, Rowland 1984; Rowland and Peterson 1988). If, for 
example, we took growth rates using the recession year of 1982 as the 
end point, the regional shifts out of the East North Central region would 
be accentuated by the severity of the 1979-82 recession in that region.
The data show that metalworking machinery employment is concen 
trated in the East North Central, Mid-Atlantic and New England regions. 
Electronic components employment is concentrated in the same three 
regions plus the Pacific region, and motor vehicles employment is con 
centrated in the East North Central region. All three industries show
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a dispersal of employment from the East North Central and Mid-Atlantic 
regions to the southern and western regions, with two exceptions. The 
Pacific states' share of motor vehicle employment declined, and the Mid- 
Atlantic states' share of motor vehicle employment increased. New 
England's share of national employment in the three industries remained 
constant over time.
Table 3.1
Regional Distribution of National Metalworking Machinery, 











































































SOURCE: The Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1973 and 1979.
New England: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.
Mid-Atlantic: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
East North Central: Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
West North Central: North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and
Kansas. 
South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 
East South Central: Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Mississippi. 
West South Central: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.
Mountain: Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. 
Pacific: California, Oregon, and Washington.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of employment across central cities, 
suburbs and nonmetropolitan areas. Both metal working machinery and
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motor vehicles establishments are primarily concentrated in central cities, 
and electronic components employment is primarily located in suburbs. 
Both metalworking machinery and motor vehicles employment have 
become more decentralized over the period, whereas electronic com 
ponents employment is becoming more centralized.
Table 3.2
Percent of Employment in Central Cities, Suburbs 
and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 1973 and 1979
Metalworking Electronic Motor
machinery components vehicles












































SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1973 and 1979.
Growth Rates by Components of Growth
One of the major strengths of the Dun and Bradstreet data is that they 
can be used to disaggregate employment growth into the components 
of change, including employment gains or losses due to (1) establishment 
start-ups, (2) closings, (3) expansions and contractions, or 
(4) relocations. Table 3.3 subdivides employment growth rates for the 
regions by these four components of change and ranks the regions by 
their employment growth rates, from the slowest- to fastest-growing 
regions. The data in table 3.3 are graphed in figures 3.1 through 3.3, 
again with the regions ranked by growth rate from the slowest- to fastest- 
growing regions. Four generalizations may be derived from these figures.
First, there is a positive association between regional growth rates 
and employment growth due to start-ups and net expansions. In general,
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the regions experiencing rapid metalworking machinery and electronic 
components employment growth appear to be doing well primarily 
because of the high rate of new business formations in those regions. 
The regions experiencing high rates of motor vehicles employment 
growth appear to be doing well because of their high rates of expan 
sions. Second, there is no evidence of a relationship between employ 
ment loss due to closings and regional growth rates. In other words, 
the slow-growth regions do not appear to be growing slowly, or declin 
ing, because of high rates of plant failures or shutdowns. Third, the 
fast-growth regions tend to experience greater employment gains due 
to net expansions than the slow-growth regions; and fourth, while the 
migration pattern behaves as expected, with the northern regions ex 
periencing net outmigration and the South and West experiencing net 
inmigration, these shifts do not play an important role in regional growth 
and decline.
These conclusions are supported by the results of three simple regres 
sion equations, where employment growth is regressed against com 
ponents of growth. The equations are as follows:
1) G^a+jSjCr+jSjDM+jSaDE
2) Gr =a+j81 Sr +j82DM+j83DE
3) G^a+ftEr+fljDM+jSaDE 
where: G=annual average rate of employment growth.
C= annual average rate of job loss due to plant closures.
S= annual average rate of job gains due to plant start-ups.
E=annual average rate of job gains (or losses) due to net ex 
pansions or contractions.
DM=dummy variable for metalworking machinery.
DE = dummy variable for electronic components. 
The jSj coefficients and their respective t-statistics are reported in table 
3.4. The results reported in table 3.4 further support the argument that 
regional variations in industry growth are the result of variations in job 
creation due to plant start-ups and net expansions and not the conse 
quence of regional variations in plant closures.
Table 3.3 
Regional Growth Rates by Component of Employment Change, 1973-79
Annual Average Percent 









































































































































































































































Regional Growth by Components of Growth, 1973-79 
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Regional Growth by Components of Growth, 1973-79 











PAC MTN ENG M-A SA NE WSC WNC ESC 
I | Startups Jill Closings Net expansion Net migration
Finally, although these general patterns hold, there are exceptions. 
For example, the Pacific region experienced higher rates of metalworking 
machinery employment growth due to start-ups than the East South Cen 
tral and South Atlantic regions, yet the Pacific region experienced slower 
aggregate growth due to this region's higher rates of employment losses 
in plant closings (see table 3.3).
Table 3.4
Results of Regressions, Regional Growth on the 
Components Growth, 1975-1982









SOURCE: From data reported in table 3.3. Calculated from the Dun and Bradstreet Data. 
* Statistically significant at the .01 percent level of confidence.
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The data are partitioned in a similar fashion for central cities, suburbs, 
and nonmetropolitan areas in table 3.5. Figures 3.4 through 3.6 show 
the components of growth, again ranked from the slowest- to fastest- 
growth areas. The data indicate that metal working machinery employ 
ment is growing fastest in the suburbs, electronic components employ 
ment is growing fastest in central cities, and motor vehicle employment 
is growing fastest in nonmetropolitan areas.
Table 3.5
Annual Average Employment Growth Rates 
in Central Cities, Suburbs, and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 1973-79
Metalworking machinery
Central City Nonmetropolitan Suburbs
Start-ups 4.3 4.9 7.1
Closings -7.0 -5.7 -5.4
Net expansions 0.5 2.9 1.9
Migration -0.2 -0.2 0.4

















































SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1973-79.
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Intraregional Growth by Components of Growth, 1973-79 
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For all three industries the intraregional pattern is similar to the 
regional pattern in that high industry growth rates are explained by high 
start-up rates and, for motor vehicles, by expansions rather than by low 
rates of employment losses due to plant closures. Again, there is no 
evidence that rates of job loss due to plant closures are higher in slow- 
growth than fast-growth regions.
David Birch used the total D&B file, including establishments from 
all sectors, to examine the regional pattern of employment growth by 
components of change. Birch's work covers the time period 1969 to 
1976, and he disaggregates the data into the four major regions of North 
East, North Central, South, and West. Birch reports three findings 
similar to ours. One, that the rate of job loss through closures and on- 
site contractions is fairly constant across regions, approximately 8 per 
cent per year between 1969 and 1976. Two, that the difference in growth 
rates between fast- and slow-growing regions appears to lie in the rate 
of job creation due to expansions and births of new firms. And three, 
that interregional migration accounts for an insignificant percentage of 
regional employment change (Birch 1979). In spite of different ad 
justments to the basic D&B data base (some of which are described 
in chapter 2) and their coverage of different years, these findings are 
also supported by the Brookings studies (Armington and Odle 1982a). 
The similarity in our results indicates that Birch's and the Brookings 
Institution's results hold when the data are disaggregated by industry 
and that our findings can be generalized to most industries.
Regional Rates of Job Loss
This section looks specifically at how important plant closings are 
in total employment loss and estimates rates of total job loss by region. 
Table 3.6 and figures 3.7 through 3.9 show rates of job loss by the 
nine census regions. Job loss is defined here as those employment losses 
by either a plant closing, the contraction of a continuing establishment, 
or the relocation of a plant out-of-state. Job loss may approximate, but 
is not equivalent to worker displacement. First, when a plant is relocated 
some employees move with the enterprise. Second, workers laid off
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an on-going business may be rehired. Third, a job may be lost but no 
displacement occur because of attrition.
To minimize the inclusion of temporary layoffs in the number of jobs 
lost due to establishment contractions, the estimates in table 3.6 include 
only the expansionary period, 1975-79. Workers laid off during a reces 
sion, such as occurred from 1973 to 1975 or 1979 to 1982, are more 
likely to be cyclically unemployed than workers laid off during an 
economic expansion.
The regions in figures 3.7 through 3.9 are again ranked by industry 
growth rates. In all industries, plant closings are responsible for the 
majority of lost jobs. A relatively small proportion of jobs appear to 
be lost due to plant outmigrations.
For the metalworking machinery and electronic components industries, 
rates of job loss are no higher in the slow-growth than the fast-growth 
regions. This conclusion would hold even if the definition of displace 
ment were limited to plant closures and excluded relocations and 
contractions.
The pattern for motor vehicles is different. As shown in figure 3.9, 
jobs lost due to plant closures, contractions, and relocations are greater 
when the regional growth is slower. Contrary to the findings reported 
in table 3.3 and figure 3.3 from the years 1973 to 1979, this associa 
tion is due in large part to the higher rates of job loss due to plant closures 
in the slow-growth regions. The motor vehicle industry may behave 
differently from metalworking machinery and electronic components 
for the following reason. When industry employment shrinks in a region, 
it may first contract by the failure of job gains from start-ups to replace 
job losses due to an average rate of closings. As the industry declines 
even further, and the start-up rate is already very low, further industrial 
decline must occur through rising closure rates.
The 1975-79 motor vehicle results may differ from those of 1973-79 
because start-ups may have originally fallen during the 1973-75 reces 
sion. As this industry continued to decline during the 1975-79 national 
recovery, there were few industry start-ups to absorb further economic 
decline.
To summarize, in the years 1975 to 1979, the rate of motor vehicle 
job loss was greater in the regions where motor vehicle employment 
was declining, but this pattern did not hold for the metalworking
Table 3.6 
Employment Losses by Reason, 1975-79
Annual Average Percent 
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Ranked from Region with Slowest to Fastest Industry Growth
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machinery and electronic components industries, where there is no 
evidence of a correlation between economic decline and job loss.
Numbers of Jobs Lost By Regions
Another issue relevant to state and federal policymakers concerned 
with plant closing legislation is where displaced workers are concen 
trated. The numbers of displaced workers are highest in the regions 
with the largest employment base (see table 3.7). For example, the East 
North Central region, with the largest share of national metalworking 
machinery employment, lost nearly 80,000 jobs between 1975 and 1979, 
whereas the Mountain region, the area with the lowest percent of na 
tional metalworking machinery employment, lost only an estimated 1,542 
jobs during this period. The region experiencing the largest losses in 
electronic component employment was the Pacific region (87,000 jobs), 
and while the largest motor vehicle employment losses were in the East 
North Central region (299,107 jobs).
Regional Variations in Plant Closing Rates 
and the Structure of Local Economies
Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a negative relationship between 
rates of job loss (due to plant closings, relocations, or contractions) and 
economic growth in the metalworking machinery and electronic com 
ponents industries. There is, however, some evidence that, during the 
1975-79 expansion, rates of worker displacement in the motor vehicle 
industry were highest in the regions where motor vehicle employment 
growth was slowest.
In this section, we test the hypothesis that regional variations in plant 
closure rates exist, but are hidden by differences in the age, size and 
status composition of establishments in the regional economy. For ex 
ample, headquarters of a given size and age may close at lower rates 
in the Sun Belt than the Frost Belt, but the Sun Belt regions may still 
have a high overall closure rate. The reason is that a large proportion 
of Sun Belt employment could be in new, small plants and in branch
Table 3.7 





























































































































































SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet DMI file, 1975 and 1979.
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plants and subsidiaries that close at higher than average rates. Here we 
test whether the closure rates of similar types of plants vary across the 
regions.
Closing rates are expected to be particularly high for new firms, small 
establishments, and branch plants and subsidiaries. Opening a new 
business is a risky venture. The perceived market may not exist or may 
not be large enough to sustain the new enterprise. Another common 
reason new firms fail is that many entrepreneurs do not have sufficient 
capital to sustain the company through several years of losses. Banks 
are less likely to lend money to companies without a proven track record, 
and new companies are generally too small for other sources of capital, 
such as public capital markets, private stock sales, or bond placements. 
Thus, regional economies with a high proportion of employment in new 
firms should, all other factors held constant, experience relatively high 
closure rates.
Small companies also experience relatively high closing rates. Small 
firms have limited access to financial capital and are therefore more 
likely to be forced out of business than larger firms when personal 
sources of revenue or retained earnings run short (Litvak and Daniels 
1979). In addition, during bad economic times larger establishments 
can contract, whereas smaller establishments close. Thus, regions with 
a high proportion of employment in small establishments may also ex 
perience higher rates of plant closings.
A number of authors have speculated that branch plants and sub 
sidiaries provide a less stable employment base than single-plant enter 
prises. One theory is that managers of multiplant firms allocate capital 
more efficiently and rationally than managers of single-plant firms and 
therefore are quick to close branch plants that do not yield sufficiently 
high rates of return. A second theory argues that large corporations are 
more likely to mismanage acquisitions, resulting in losses and, ultimately, 
in closings.
Disinvestment and plant shutdowns may occur more readily in 
multiplant than single-plant firms because managers of the former have 
a wider scan of investment possibilities. First, the managers of multiplant 
firms can easily shift cash flows among branches and subsidiaries. 
Williamson (1975, pp. 147-148) argues that one of the greatest advan-
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tages of multidivisional firms is that capital allocation is more efficient 
internally than in capital markets external to the firm. A multidivisional 
firm has good information about all of its branches and divisions and 
therefore can assign cash flows to high yield uses, phasing out, divesting 
itself of, or closing less profitable operations. In addition, managers 
of multiplant and multidivisional operations have the expertise and staff 
to carry out a wide-ranging search outside the firm for more profitable 
sites or ventures, again phasing out less profitable activities.
The single-plant manager faces a more limited range of alternative 
investments because the cost of identifying and taking advantage of new 
investment opportunities is high. Single-plant firms probably do not have 
the staff to search out new ventures, and they are less likely to have 
the skills to operate a new line of business even if the opportunity were 
identified. Thus many small business people will probably continue to 
invest in and operate ventures that a multiplant firm would shut down 
(Cyert and March 1963; Hymer 1972, p. 120; Storper and Walker 1984).
In addition, small entrepreneurs will be more likely to keep a plant 
operating when its profits fall below those of alternative investments 
because they draw a salary from the business and live in, derive status 
from, and have a commitment to the community where the business 
is located. Noneconomic benefits, therefore, may compensate the small 
entrepreneur for lower rates of return (Westaway 1974, p. 151; Dicken 
1976, pp. 404-405; Erickson 1976; McGranahan 1982).
Evidence of plant closures in Philadelphia supports the view that 
branch plants or multibranch and multidivisional firms demand higher 
rates of return to operate than do single-plant enterprises. Hochner and 
Zibman (1982, pp. 204-205) found that over a 10-year period, indepen 
dent firms did not close until their sales revenues failed to keep pace 
with inflation. National corporations closed firms that had average sales 
increases which kept pace with inflation, and multinational corpora 
tions closed branches that experienced average sales growth rates sur 
passing the inflation rate.
Another school of thought explaining why subsidiaries and branches 
are more susceptible to shutdown than single-plant operations contends 
that plant disinvestments and shutdowns occur where rates of return 
are low relative to alternative investment possibilities. In this model,
Spatial Patterns 51
private firms are often responsible for the low return of their branches 
and subsidiaries. In the most recent merger movement, companies are 
spending human and financial resources to acquire and divest themselves 
of existing businesses in order to improve the "bottom line" of their 
balance sheets. This "paper entrepreneurism" diverts resources from 
research and development on new product lines and production methods, 
from the development of new, more efficient management techniques, 
and from investments in state-of-the-art technologies. This short-run 
approach to improving profit performance has led to falling rates of 
profits in many branches and subsidiaries, resulting, in many cases, 
in their closing (Reich 1983).
In addition, corporations frequently acquire businesses in which they 
have little operating experience. As a result, a once profitable acquisi 
tion may be poorly managed, become unprofitable, and ultimately be 
closed (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, pp. 151-159). For example, profits 
in the New England Provision Company, a meat packing plant, began 
to decline shortly after its acquisition by LTV. It was estimated that 
management fees, inept management hired by LTV, and required pur 
chasing from other holdings of LTV cost the plant an additional 
$325,000. Consequently, the New England Provision Company was 
eventually closed. In another case, Clinton Colonial Press was acquired 
by Sheller Globe in 1974 during the purchase of Clinton's parent com 
pany, an auto parts business. Lacking interest and management exper 
tise in the printing business, Sheller Globe closed the plant in 1976 (C 
and R Associates 1978, p. 49).
Alternatively, McKenzie (1982) predicts that branches and subsidiaries 
are less likely to close than single-plant operations. He argues that con 
glomerate ownership should lead to the continued operation of many 
plants that would close under local ownership. A locally-owned firm, 
with limited access to capital and without a cushion of profits from other 
product lines on a different business cycle, might be forced to close 
a temporarily unprofitable plant for lack of funds to carry it through 
a financial storm. A conglomerate would spread the losses over a number 
of varied ventures enabling it to subsidize temporarily unprofitable plants 
and adding to job stability.
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The evidence on the instability of branch plant employment is mix 
ed. Evidence from Great Britain shows that branches are not particularly 
susceptible to closure (Townroe 1975). Erickson's (1980) findings are 
similar. He studied branch plant closings in rural Wisconsin and found 
that the annual closure rate among branches between 1959 and 1977 
was 3.3 percent. This figure compares favorably with an average an 
nual closure rate for all firms in the U.S. economy of 8 percent.
Other authors have found contradictory results. Barkley (1978) found 
that, over the period 1965-75, branch plants in rural Iowa were more 
likely to close than locally-owned plants, and Bluestone and Harrison 
found that corporations and conglomerates together were reponsible for 
a disproportionate share of job loss through plant closings in New 
England (1982, p. 34). Barkley's and Bluestone and Harrison's findings 
are consistent with the findings presented here.
The distribution of new firms, small establishments, and branch plants 
and subsidiaries should vary across local economies for several reasons. 
First, as shown above, fast-growth economies have relatively high plant 
start-up rates. Thus, fast-growth economies should have a relatively 
high percent of employment in new firms. Second, Armington and Odle 
(1982b) found small firms to be larger contributors to growth in the 
slow-growth regions. They present, as one explanation, the fact that 
large business expansion plans may dominate the short-run supply of 
labor, locations, and capital and squeeze out small firms in the fast- 
growth regions. In the less competitive economies, small firms fill the 
gap left by the retreat of the larger companies. Finally, a number of 
authors have argued that southern economies are more dependent on 
branch plant employment than northern economies. According to this 
argument, economic growth in the southern states is due, in large part, 
to the expansion of northern firms into the southern economy.
Data from the Dun and Bradstreet file indicate that the phenomenon 
of southern branches controlled by Frost Belt headquarters is signifi 
cant. Birch (1979, pp. 45-46) found that over the period 1960-1976, 
Frost Belt firms controlled nearly 70 percent of the South's net job growth 
in manufacturing. Analyzing data on the computer industry, Hekman 
(1980, p. 12) found that New England and the Mid-Atlantic states were 
more likely to be home to headquarters than branches and that the South
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Atlantic and South Central regions had few headquarters relative to the 
branches they contained.
Southern economies may be relatively dependent on branch plant 
employment for two reasons. First, the product-cycle model implies 
that the South will have high concentrations of branch plants in mature 
industries. Routinized production processes and standardized products 
can be produced where workers are low-skilled and produced more 
cheaply where wages are low, i.e., the southern states. In addition, firms 
producing market-oriented products may have also spun off branches 
to the South to take advantage of expanding markets in this region 
resulting from above-average population and employment growth. Head 
quarters of both production-oriented and market-oriented firms are ex 
pected to have remained in the metropolitan areas of the Frost Belt and 
Pacific regions to retain access to financial markets, to benefit from 
agglomeration economies, and to operate in proximity to a skilled labor 
pool (Hymer 1972).
To test the extent to which plant closing rates vary across the regions, 
we estimate a model predicting the probability a plant will close, based 
on its regional location, and its size, status as an independent, head 
quarters, branch, or subsidiary, and its age. The model is estimated 
with a logit procedure. The logit model is appropriate for cases where 
the dependent variable is binary (0-1). In this case the dependent variable 
takes on the value of 1 when an establishment closed and 0 when it 
did not. The parameters are maximum likelihood estimates. Regional 
locations and establishment status enter the equations as dummy 
variables. New England is the reference economy for the regional dum 
my variables. Independent establishment is the reference catagory for 
the status dummy variables.
Three models are estimated. One includes just the regional dummies 
and tests the hypothesis that regional location influences the probabili 
ty a plant will close. The second model includes, in addition to the 
regional dummies, the size and status of the plant. The third model in 
cludes only single-plant firms. This model is estimated to test the im 
pact of age on the probability a plant will close. The age variable could 
not be included in the equation estimated with all establishments, since 
dates of birth are not available for branch plants.
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The models are estimated with D&B data from the 1975-82 period. 
This period is one mil business cycle, including the 1975 to 1979 
expansion and the 1979 to 1982 recession. These data also capture the 
most recent years in our data set. Data from the more recent cycle is 
preferable, since the DMI file has become more accurate with time.
The results of the three models are presented in tables 3.8, 3.9 and 
3.10, respectively. In all three tables, the regional results are similar, 
whether or not we control for the status, age, and size of establishment. 
In table 3.8, the significant coefficients indicate plants in the Sun Belt 
are more likely to close than plants in the Frost Belt for the metalwork- 
ing machinery and electronic components industries. In all three in 
dustries, there is only one case where the coefficient is significant and 
of the expected sign. This is in the motor vehicles equation, where the 
coefficient on East South Central is negative, indicating that the pro 
bability of a closure is lower in the region where motor vehicle employ 
ment is growing most rapidly.
Table 3.9 presents the results when plant status and size are held con 
stant. The results indicate that, as hypothesized, larger establishments 
are less likely to close than smaller establishments. The coefficients for 
this variable are statistically significant at very high levels of confidence. 
Headquarters appear to close at about the same rate as independents 
in the metalworking machinery industry, but at lower rates than in 
dependents in the electronic components and motor vehicles industries. 
Both branches and subsidiaries are more likely to close than in 
dependents. The coefficients on these variables are not only large relative 
to all other coefficients, but are significant at very high levels of 
confidence.
Table 3.10 reports the results for single-plant firms (independents) 
only. Older independents are more likely to close in the metalworking 
machinery and electronic components industries, but not in the motor 
vehicle industry. Size is statistically significant in all three industries, 
with large firms less likely to close than small firms. Again, when the 
regional variables are statistically significant they show higher plant 
closer rates in the faster-growth Sun Belt economies.
We estimated the same equations for each industry for the periods 
1975 to 1979 and 1979 to 1982. Breaking the data into recession and 
expansion does not alter the general conclusion that closing rates tend
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to be slightly higher in the faster- than in the slower-growth economies. 
We also estimated the equation with dummies for central cities, suburbs, 
and nonmetropolitan areas in each region. This was done to determine 
the extent to which regional aggregates were masking variations in plant 
closing rates within regions. These results are reported in appendix 3.1 
and do not alter the conclusions reached here.
Table 3.8













































































Fraction of pairs where 
predicted=actual response .40 .40 .45
Figures in ( ) are Chi-square statistics.
*Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
**Significant at the 5 to 10 percent level of confidence.
The apparent inconsistency, in the motor vehicle industry, between 
even closure rates across the regions and uneven rates of job loss due
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Table 3.9
Logit Estimates of Plant Closings 












































































































Figures in ( ) are Chi-square statistics.
*Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
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to plant closures across the regions may be explained by regional dif 
ferences in the average size of the closing establishment, with larger 
plants closing in the slow-growth regions. The data in table 3.11 do 
not bear this out, however. The average size of the closing plant is not 
negatively associated with economic growth. The number of workers 
in the average closing plant is substantially larger in the East North Cen 
tral than in any other region, and this may explain why we found a 
relatively large rate of job loss in the East North Central (table 3.6) 
with an average rate of plant closures (table 3.3).
Table 3.10
Logit Estimates for Probability of a Closing, 






























































































Figures in ( ) are Chi-square statistics.
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
**Statistically significant at the 5 to 10 percent level of confidence.
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Table 3.11
Average Number of Employees in Closing Plants in Motor Vehicles 
Ranked by Region with Slowest to Fastest Employment Growth
Region 
PAC MTN ENC MA SA NE WSC WNC ESC
60 12 332 77 80 31 33 47 77
SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet data, 1975, 1979, and 1982.
One explanation for higher closing rates in the Sun Belt regions may 
be a bias in the data. As indicated in chapter 2, D&B drops many con 
tinuing independent firms from the file. These tend to be firms that mov 
ed; frequently, such enterprises are growing and in need of additional 
space (Schmenner 1982). Since the data suggest that growing and ex 
panding firms are more likely to be in the Sun Belt, it is possible that 
D&B dropped more continuing firms in this region than in the slow- 
growth regions. If this is the case, the plant closure rates in the Sun 
Belt would tend to be overstated.
Summary
Three conclusions are drawn from the above data. First, there is 
little regional variation in plant closure rates, and, when there are dif 
ferences, the rates are higher in the faster-growth Sun Belt economies 
than in the Frost Belt.
Second, in the metal working machinery and electronic components 
industries, there is no evidence that a worker is more likely to be dis 
placed in areas where the industry is slow-growing than growing rapidly. 
Conversely there is no evidence that high rates of job loss explain 
regional industrial decline. Instead, rates of displacement are much the 
same in all regions and area variations in employment growth are 
primarily due to variations in start-up rates and expansions. There is 
some evidence, however, that rates of displacement from the motor
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vehicle industry are higher in the regions experiencing the greatest losses 
in motor vehicle employment. It is possible that in industries such as 
motor vehicles where births are already very low, further economic 
decline must occur through increased rates of plant closurees.
Third, we find that most of the jobs lost in a region, are lost through 
plant closings. The second most important cause of job loss is contrac 
tions, while relocations play only a small role. These conclusions argue 
that a closure is no more likely to occur in a declining than a growing 
economy, not that the consequences of a plant closure are equally severe 
in all regions, a topic explored in more detail in chapter 5. In chapter 
4, we directly address the causes of plant closures.
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Appendix 3.1
Logit Estimates for Probability of a Closing
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*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence of greater.
**Statistically significant at the 5 to 10 percent level of confidence. 
( ) Chi-square statistics.
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Regional Rates of Profit
Regional employment growth is determined by the rate at which jobs 
are created through establishment start-ups, expansions, and the inmigra- 
tion of plants, minus the rate at which jobs are phased out by plant 
closures, contractions, and the outmigration of establishments. There 
is a well-developed theoretical and empirical literature on the factors 
that encourage job creation, including the economic conditions that spawn 
local jobs and draw firms and branch plants to a location (Stafford 1980; 
Smith 1981). On the other hand, there has been surprisingly little study 
of the reverse side of location theory, the factors that influence the deci 
sion to permanently close or relocate a plant.
Data presented in chapter 3 show that plant closing rates and rates 
of worker displacement are no higher in areas where industry is declining 
than where industry is experiencing strong growth. This finding sug 
gests the factors dampening new start-ups in a region may not be the 
same ones influencing plant closures.
Chapter 4 explores the causes of plant closings by using a model that 
estimates the probability a plant will close. We hypothesize that the prob 
ability of a plant's closing during some period is a function of the plant's 
profit level at the beginning of the period and the change in the plant's 
profits during the period compared to profits a plant could have earned 
in some other region. We also hypothesize that there are regional varia 
tions in profit levels and these are the result of regional differences in 
production costs and revenues. Plant profits are expected to be lower 
where production costs are relatively high and markets are declining.
The following five hypotheses are tested. Plant closures are influenced 
by (1) local production cost levels, (2) the extent of unionization of the 
labor force, (3) changes in local prodution costs relative to changes in
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costs in other regions, (4) the degree of industry import competition, 
and (5) local and national market growth.
The chapter begins with a review of previous literature on the causes 
of plant closures and the conditions found to influence investment. 
Because the latter issue has received a great deal of attention in the 
literature, we focus on studies that have also used the Dun and Bradstreet 
(D&B) DMI file. Next we present the model and report the results of 
the empirical tests, which use the D&B data described in chapter 2. 
The D&B data were supplemented with data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Census, and U.S. Department of Energy.
The statistical results provide little evidence that the economic variables 
identified here are responsible for plant closures. The only variable that 
consistently influences the probability a plant will close is the plant's 
status as a branch, headquarters, independent, or subsidiary, with 
branches and subsidiaries closing at much higher rates than headquarters 
and independents. For independents (single-plant firms), the firm's age 
and size are also factors in the probability the plant will shut down.
Previous Literature
Most empirical research on the causes of plant closures is based on 
surveys of managers responsible for closing a plant. For example, 
Schmenner (1982, pp. 237-239) conducted a survey of 175 closing 
facilities. He found that 21 percent attributed their closing to high labor 
costs, 10 percent cited unions, 2 percent cited high energy costs, and 
1 percent claimed high taxes were factors. Fifteen percent cited com 
petitive pressures from foreign producers and 58 percent cited domestic 
competition as additional reasons for their plant closings. Schmenner's 
findings lend support to the hypothesis that spatial differences in factor 
costs, unionization rates and market growth should result in spatial dif 
ferences in plant closure rates. Gainer (1986) surveyed 355 managers 
who closed plants and found 57 percent of them attributed the closing 
to high labor costs. The Rhode Island Strategic Development Commis 
sion (1983) surveyed all manufacturing firms of 50 employees or more 
that either closed or experienced major layoffs in Rhode Island between
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January 1,1972 and August 31, 1982 to determine the reasons for these 
job losses. During this period, 177 firms closed. The commission found 
that the lack of business acumen, overexpansion, overleveraging or in- 
abiity of new management to successfully operate a business led to the 
majority of firm failures. They did not find labor problems or energy 
costs to be a primary cause of firm failure.
Authors of the Rhode Island study believe their results differ from 
those of Schmenner because the Rhode Island sample is dominated by 
small independents, whereas Schmenner surveyed Fortune 500 firms. 
The few national corporations included in the Rhode Island study also 
reported high costs among their reasons for closure (Reamer 1987).
Massey and Meegan (1982) examined nearly 60 industries to study 
the different mechanisms of employment decline. They categorized each 
industry by its causes of displacement, including: job loss due to 
technological change; intensification of the production process, i.e., 
increasing worker productivity without substantial technological change; 
and rationalization of the production process, i.e., cutbacks in declin 
ing industries. They found that firms within each of the three categories, 
in fact within each industry, exhibit a wide variety of responses to the 
same external circumstances. For example, firms in a declining industry 
may close plants, diversify product lines, or seek new markets, and 
as a consequence, there were no obvious spatial patterns to their employ 
ment adjustments. They suggest that more generalizations might be possi 
ble if the data were analyzed by other categorical breakdowns, such 
as the size of firm or the nature of the labor process.
Press accounts of closings also lend support to the view that high 
wages, energy costs and tax rates can be responsible for plant closures. 
For example, Duracell Inc. closed a lithium battery manufacturing plant 
in North Tarrytown, New York, laying off 200 employees. John 
Bergman, a spokesman for Duracell, said the plant had become un 
profitable because of high taxes, along with high fuel costs (New York 
Times, 2/2/84, p. 4:6).
While statistical research on plant closures is rare, a number of em 
pirical studies have looked at the reverse question of which factors en 
courage the birth and location of new firms and the location of branch 
plants. A number of these studies have used the D&B data. Carlton
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(1979) used the D&B data to study the birth and location decisions of 
plants in the plastic products, electric transmitting equipment, and the 
electronic components industries. Modeling the start-up and location 
decision of independents separately from those of branch plants, Carlton 
found that wages had the greatest impact on the location of single-plant 
firms. For every 1 percent decrease in wages, new births increased by 
1 percent. Aside from wages, the existence of agglomeration economies, 
the availability of a skilled labor force, and for two of the three industries, 
low energy costs also had a positive effect on a Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area's (SMSAs) rate of business start-ups. The results for 
branch plants were similar, except that a local skilled labor force was 
less important for branches than for independents.
Harris (1986) conducted a study similar to Carlton's, using data on 
branch and new firm start-ups in the high technology sector. She found 
SMSAs with a skilled labor force, low energy costs, and agglomera 
tion economies attracted the greatest number of start-ups. Branch plants 
were drawn to SMSAs with agglomeration economies and a skilled labor 
force.
Rowland (1985) also tested a model of new firm start-ups using the 
D&B data. Rowland's study differed from those of Carlton and Harris 
in that she used data on 106 counties in New Jersey, Maryland, 
Washington, D.C., and Virginia from the metalworking machinery and 
electronic components industries. Her findings show the greatest number 
of firm births and employment gains due to births were in the counties 
with low wages near metropolitan areas. Proximity to a Ph.D.-granting 
university also influenced the start-up of firms in the electronic com 
ponents industry.
Rees (1979) found the Southwest had become a spawning ground for 
innovations and growth industries, and not merely a receiving ground 
for standardized production processes from the northern states. Using 
data compiled by the Bureau of Business Research at the University 
of Texas at Austin in combination with the D&B data, Rees found that 
61 percent of new firms in Dallas/Fort Worth were firm births and 39 
percent were branch plants. Fifty-seven percent of the branches had 
headquarters in the local area. Rees attributes this strong local job genera 
tion to the growth of agglomeration economies and local markets in 
the Sun Belt.
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In general, this literature concludes that firms locate where they can 
operate most profitably. Results from the above studies, as well as others 
(Smith 1981; Stafford 1980; Malecki 1981), show most new firms and 
branches operate most profitably where wages are relatively low, energy 
costs are low, agglomeration economies exist, and an appropriately skill 
ed labor force is available. Do these same factors increase the profitability 
of existing establishments and reduce the probability they will close? 
This is the question addressed below.
The Causes of Plant Closures—Five Hypotheses
We hypothesize that the probability of a plant permanently closing 
during some period is a function of the profit level at the beginning 
of the period and the change in profits during the period. A plant will 
continue to operate at its current site as long as economic profits are 
positive and as long as profits in the current location exceed profits that 
could be earned in alternative locations, minus transaction costs 
associated with relocating, or as long as
(1) TRj-TC^Oand,
(2) TRi - TCt >TR0 - TC0 - Tj, where
TR= Total revenue
TC = Long run total costs
Tj = Transactions costs associated with relocating or closing plant i
i = Plant at the current location
o = Plant's next most profitable location
When the conditions in (1) or (2) no longer hold, the process of disinvest 
ment begins, and closure can be predicted.
Equation (2) makes explicit that factor prices in other locations (TCJ 
and transaction costs associated with closing (Tj), including, the plant's 
scrap value, the values of tax write-offs, severance payments to workers, 
and site clean-up costs if the plant were to close, influence closures. 
For example, a reduction in wages at another site would increase the 
opportunity costs of operating at the current location (by lowering TC,,) 
and increase the probability of closure. Higher required severance pay-
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ment to workers if the plant should close should increase the trans 
actions cost of closure (Tj) and reduce the likelihood of a shutdown. 
There are several reasons to expect profit levels to vary spatially and 
to result in variations in plant closure rates. Five hypotheses are ad 
dressed below.
Hypothesis 1: Regional Differences in the Price of Inputs
One assumption projecting regional variations in rates of plant closures 
is that plants in some regions, particularly the industrialized North, have 
higher production costs not compensated for by scale economies or 
transport costs. These higher production costs result in lower rates of 
plant profit, which in turn lead to higher-than-average rates of plant 
closures.
Hulten and Schwab (1983) provide evidence that profit rates vary 
spatially and are, in fact, lower in the high-cost regions of the U.S. 
They found a 15.9 percent annual average rate of return to capital in 
the Sun Belt and a 14.2 percent return in the Frost Belt states for the 
period 1951 to 1978.
Plants should close at above average rates in the low-profit regions 
as establishments both fail at above average rates and relocate to the 
lower cost areas of the country.
A number of authors have argued this hypothesis. Leary (1985, p. 
115) states:
High labor costs, aging infrastructure, and increasingly 
burdensome regulatory restrictions. . . . are creating disad 
vantageous conditions for firms operating in these [North and 
North Central] regions. It is the 'push' of these higher costs 
in the frostbelt .... which is causing the trivial amount of 
outmigration.
Mansfield (1985, p. 244) makes the argument for the textile industry. 
Considerable excess capacity existed in the cotton textile in 
dustry from about 1924 to 1936. ... It is also important to 
note mat profit rates in cotton textiles were higher in the South 
than the North. Profits in the South averaged 6 percent, 
whereas profits inthe North averaged 1 percent. This was
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due to the fact that the prices of many inputs—like labor and 
raw cotton—were lower in the South.
If we are given a situation of this sort, what would the 
perfectly competitive model predict? . . . Many firms would 
have to leave the industry. . . . The industry would tend to 
become concentrated more heavily in the South, the exit rate 
being higher in the North than in the South.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) follow a parallel line of reasoning in 
their book The Deindustrialization of America. They argue that regional 
disinvestment and plant closures in the Frost Belt states are the conse 
quence of both high production costs in the northern states and intensi 
fying competition in many basic U.S. industries.
Firms in some of the United States' basic industries were willing and 
able to pay higher prices for inputs when output was concentrated in 
a few oligopolists and profit levels were sizable in the late 1940s, 1950s 
and 1960s. In the 1970s, the profit margins eroded. From the period 
1963-66 to 1967-70, real rates of return for all nonfinancial corpora 
tions in the U.S. fell from 15.5 percent to 12.7 percent. By the 1975-1978 
period, rates of return had fallen to 9.7 percent.
This profit squeeze was caused primarily by intensified competition 
and falling market shares. Firms found their northern operations were 
especially hard hit because of high production costs in this region, and 
as companies began to search for ways to restore profit margins, they 
began phasing out plants located in high cost regions and reinvesting 
their capital in new or existing plants in the lower cost areas, both 
domestic and foreign.
For example, during the 1950s and 1960s the oligopolistic structure 
of the American auto industry permitted wage increases, negotiated by 
union leaders, to be easily passed on to consumers. When U.S. pro 
ducers were faced with intensifying competition from lower cost Japanese 
and German imports in the 1970s, revenues and profit levels fell, and 
the American auto companies could no longer hold their market share 
while continuing to pay the high wages and benefits negotiated during 
better economic times. To cut costs in this new competitive climate, 
companies began to shift production out of the high-cost North Central 
region to lower cost regions of the U.S. and abroad, and to outsource,
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or purchase inputs from abroad that were once produced internally by 
the firm or from other American suppliers. Outsourcing reduces costs 
when manufactured inputs can be purchased at lower cost than they can 
be produced "in house" (Bluestone and Harrison 1982).
Hypothesis #1 applies only to firms facing competition, since firms 
in concentrated industries can pass at least some of the cost increases 
on to consumers and therefore may not be driven to seek minimum- 
cost locations. As indicated by Bluestone and Harrison, it was not until 
the auto industry faced increased competition that it began to shift in 
vestment out of the high-cost regions.
This argument is also unlikely to apply to industrial activity in the 
earliest stages of the product cycle (see Vernon 1966). When a product 
is at the innovation stage, the product design is still variable and the 
production process flexible. Producers, therefore, require proximity to 
a specialized and skilled labor force, to other manufacturers in order 
to monitor their discoveries, and to venture capital markets. For in 
novative activities, nearness to these specialized inputs is likely to com 
pensate for high factor costs.
To summarize, we expect profits to be relatively low in locations where 
wages, energy costs, and taxes are high, referring back to equations 
(1) and (2), where TCj are high. Plant closures are expected to be 
higher in regions where profit levels are relatively low, especially in 
more competitive industries and where production has become 
standardized.
Hypothesis 2: Unionization
In addition to higher costs, the extent to which a local labor force 
is unionized may also influence plant-level profits and the probability 
a plant will close. Two arguments are relevant here.
The first argument is that a highly unionized labor force reduces plant 
profit levels by demanding higher wages, receiving more generous fringe 
benefits, imposing inflexible work rules on the production site, demand 
ing minimum shop-safety standards, and instituting work stoppages 
and strikes. Holding all other conditions constant, indirect costs may 
therefore be higher and profits lower in plants with a unionized labor
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force. Thus, we conjecture that, faced with increased competition and 
downward pressure on prices, U.S. producers in the unionized regions 
are more likely to close and to relocate to nonunion labor markets. 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, pp. 147-148) also argue this hypothesis:
it now seems to be a fair generalization that, for the most 
part, the geographic patterning of deindustrialization has to 
do with the proclivity of companies to shift capital out of 
older industrial areas to escape having to live with a labor 
force that . . . had become costly. . . . [C]ompanies 
are . . . shifting operations . . . into the Sun Belt, non-union 
peripheries within the North and abroad.
Again, this hypothesis may not apply to firms that face little com 
petition or plants producing products in the earliest stage of the pro 
duct cycle. Firms in concentrated, less competitive industries are less 
driven to seek out cost-minimizing sites, since they can pass some of 
their higher costs on to consumers. Plants producing a state-of-the-art 
product require a highly skilled labor force, and managers may have 
to work with unions to fulfill this requirement.
A second argument is that unions will increase the likelihood of a 
closing among firms adopting new technologies. Firms acquiring new 
technologies generally undergo changes in skill requirements. Some 
workers become redundant, and employers would prefer to lay them 
off. Other workers must be retrained for new tasks. Both of these ad 
justments are more easily made in a nonunion than in a union plant. 
In plants where unions have negotiated rigid job categories and made 
layoffs due to technological change costly and difficult, the adjustment 
to a new technology can be a slow and contentious process. Employers 
may, therefore, find it less expensive to close the plant and start over 
in a new location with a new technology and new labor force than to 
attempt to increase productivity at an existing plant. We therefore predict 
a higher rate of plant closures in locations where a higher percentage 
of workers are unionized.
Hypothesis 3: Changes in Factor Prices
There are three reasons to expect that plants located in areas with 
greater than the national average increase (or a smaller-than-average
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decrease) in input prices should experience above average rates of plant 
closures. First, increases in local production costs should reduce profit 
levels in local plants and force many marginal plants facing elastic de 
mand curves to close. Referring back to equation (1), TCj will increase, 
making the condition for closure more likely. Second, the opportunity 
cost of operating in the now higher cost region will increase, making 
the now lower cost sites relatively more profitable. This is shown in 
equation (2), by an increase in TQ. Managers will respond by 
relocating to and reinvesting in the now lower cost regions. Third, when 
increases in labor costs are responsible for cost increases, the company 
may install labor saving technologies. When these new technologies 
cannot be adopted at an existing plant, closure is more likely. Again, 
this hypothesis is expected to apply to firms in competitive industries, 
since such firms are less able to absorb losses or pass increased costs 
on to consumers, and to firms not tied to high-cost regions because of 
a specially skilled labor force.
To summarize, holding all other variables constant, we expect the 
loss in profits to be greatest and, therefore, plant closures highest in 
the locations with the greatest increases in production costs.
Hypothesis 4: Import Penetration
Growing dependence on imports, in particular from Third World coun 
tries, is receiving widespread blame for the decline in U.S. manufac 
turing employment and the spread of industrial plant closures. Three 
examples are cited here:
[W]ith import penetration rates reaching 50 percent or over 
for the last three years, hardly a month goes by without the 
closing of another shoe plant (Fecteau and Mera 1981, p. 88).
There are things happening as a result of our foreign trade 
policies that are undermining U.S. economic strength—and 
these things should not go uncorrected. These things include 
the loss of jobs to imports (Finley 1981, p. 78).
Too many dollars spent by U.S. consumers are stimulating 
jobs in Asia, rather than Alabama. Troubled U.S. manufac-
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turers are shutting U.S. plants or shifting abroad, as cheap 
imports clobber U.S. companies (Phillips 1984, p. Fl).
Both price competition from abroad and the loss of markets are reduc 
ing revenues and cutting into the profits of U.S. producers, especially 
those producers in mature industries utilizing a low-skilled U.S. labor 
force. We conjecture, therefore, that plant closures are more likely to 
occur in industries and regional economies dependent on a low-skilled 
labor force.
The product cycle model, referred to above, predicts changes in an 
industry's locational requirements as that industry's product evolves 
from an innovative to a mature and highly standardized product (Ver- 
non 1966). In the early stage of innovation, production methods are 
fluid and decisions about the manner of production and the configura 
tion of the innovation must be made quickly and frequently. This need 
for flexibility requires that production take place in proximity to deci- 
sionmakers, a skilled labor force that can adjust to changes in the pro 
duction process, and agglomeration economies so specialized services 
can be called in and the activities of competitors monitored.
As the product becomes standardized and production methods routine, 
ties to decisionmakers, a skilled labor force and agglomeration economies 
relax, and firms can then begin a nationwide or worldwide scan for 
new production sites. At this stage, firms can locate branches to take 
advantage of low-skilled and lower cost labor (Vernon 1966).
The low-wage sites in the United States have been mainly in the South 
with its unskilled and growing labor force from its own rural popula 
tion and Mexico and the Caribbean. The textiles and shoe industries 
moved South in the 1920s and 1930s. Electronics moved South in the 
1950s and 1960s and semiconductors moved South in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. During these periods, plant closures should have been par 
ticularly high in these respective industries in the industrialized states 
and in the case of semiconductors, in California.
Because of intensifying international competition and improved com 
munications and transport, U.S. companies are now shifting the pro 
duction of these standardized products even further afield to low-wage 
countries. Another increasingly common way of reducing the costs of
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inputs is outsourcing, i.e., purchasing components manufactured abroad 
which were previously produced internally by the firm. In either case, 
U.S. plants producing with low-skilled labor are expected to be especially 
vulnerable to closure as they fail to compete with imports or move 
overseas. Whereas the first two hypotheses predict higher plant closure 
rates in the northern industrial states, this and the third hypothesis predict 
higher closure rates in southern states. In terms of the model, this 
hypothesis explains decreases in TC0 because technological change in 
production processes and communications have made a new range of 
alternative production locations possible.
Aside from passing through the product-cycle model, additional 
characteristics of industries likely to be hard hit by imports and to shift 
production overseas are those with a high value-to-weight ratio and a 
high elasticity of demand. A high value-to-weight ratio implies low 
transport costs as a proportion of product value. A high elasticity of 
demand implies that small differences in price will make large differences 
in the size of the market for the product (Vernon 1966).
Empirical work on industrial location and trade patterns offer some 
support to the product cycle model. In the computer industry (SIC 3572), 
plants in the vicinity of highly skilled computer workers, such as in 
the Northeast and northern California, are more involved in the design 
and development of new computer systems. The production of peripheral 
computer equipment is dispersing to areas where workers are less skilled 
and less expensive, such as Tennessee, Nebraska, South Dakota, Utah, 
North and South Carolina, and Florida (Hekman 1980a). In a second 
example, new branch plants in the specialized surgical instrument in 
dustry were found to be moving into the major centers of current pro 
duction rather than into the low-wage regions such as the South (Hekman 
1980b). Surgical equipment may be an industry which is still early in 
the product life cycle and still requires a highly skilled labor force, or 
it may be an industry which never goes through the classic product 
cycle phases.
A study of the Committee for Economic Development (1984, pp. 
92-93) determined the extent to which developing country exports are 
replacing domestic production in the U.S. Import penetration ratios, 
measured as the ratio of imports from the developing countries to ap-
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parent domestic consumption (domestic production plus imports minus 
exports) were calculated. The numbers demonstrated that developing 
country exports constitute only 3 percent of all goods consumed in the 
U.S., but market penetration has increased rapidly, rising 11.3 per 
cent over the decade of the 1970s. Moreover, this report indicated, as 
expected, that U.S. imports from developing countries were heavily 
concentrated in low-wage, labor-intensive industries, with over 50 per 
cent in textiles, apparel, and electrical machinery.
To summarize, because low-wage, low-skilled manufacturing 
establishments are facing intense foreign competition, we expect profit 
rates to be relatively low and plant closures likely in import-competing 
industries and regions dependent on low-skilled, low-wage labor.
Hypothesis 5: Market Demand
The fifth and final hypothesis is that plants faced with declining de 
mand for their product will be most likely to experience falling revenues, 
shrinking profits, and closure. Markets can be local or national in scope. 
For example, many manufacturers produce intermediate inputs for local 
producers, which in turn sell to a national or local market. Other firms 
in the same industry produce for a national market, and some, of course, 
produce for both local and national markets. Since we cannot identify 
the scope of the market for each plant in our study, we hypothesize 
that growth in both national and local demand affect each plant. We 
expect to find a higher probability of closure for plants manufacturing 
products for which there is a shrinking national market and that are 
located in a declining regional economy. Closures will be least likely 
for plants located in growing regions and producing products for which 
there is strong national demand. In terms of the model, plants experien 
cing a drop in TRj are more likely to experience negative profits in 
equation (1) and consequently to close.
Summary of Hypotheses
To summarize, we hypothesize that plant level profits are influenced 
by the level of local production costs, the extent to which the plant's
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labor force is unionized, changes in local production costs relative to 
costs in other regions, the extent to which the plant is competing with 
foreign imports, and the growth in local and national markets for the 
plant's product. The probability a plant will be shut down rises as its 
level of profit falls. The model is the following:
(3) PCi)t_t+1 =f [TCf)t , (U/U0)t ,A(TC/TC0)t_t+1 , IM_t+1 , Mi>t.t+1)]. 
Where:
PC; =The probability plant i will close.
TC = Total production costs.
Ur/U0 =Rate of local labor force unionization, relative to the
national rate of unionization.
A(TCr/TC0)=Change in local production costs relative to the nation. 
I = Import penetration. 
Mj = Change in demand for plant i's output, 
r = Local economy, 
t = Beginning of period, 
t -I-1 = End of period. 
i = Plant.
Empirical Test
The model tests the effects of local production cost levels, unioniza 
tion, changes in local production costs relative to costs in other loca 
tions, import penetration, and growth in market demand on the prob 
ability a plant will close. The model is tested on three industries: 
metalworking machinery (SIC 354), electronic components (SIC 367), 
and motor vehicles (SIC 371). The selection of these three industries 
was discussed in chapter 2. The observations are plants in the Dun and 
Bradstreet data set in 1975.
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable takes on value of 1 if the plant was in ex 
istence in 1975 and not in existence in 1982. The dependent variable takes
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on the value of zero if the plant remained open throughout the period. 
The 1975 to 1982 period was selected to include one full business cy 
cle. The period 1975 to 1979 was an expansionary year for the national 
economy, and 1979 to 1982 was a recessionary period. The inclusion 
of one full cycle minimizes any biases in the results that occur due to 
regional variations in the severity of business cycles (see Howland 1984). 
For example, the industrialized mid western states experience more 
volatile business cycles than the rest of the country because of their 
dependence on capital goods production. The inclusion of only years 
that coincided with a recession may make it appear that high wages lead 
to plant closures, when the true cause of high closures in the Midwest 
was the business cycle rather than the region's high wages.
The test only includes plant closures that occurred in SMSAs. The 
reason is as follows. To test the impact of local conditions on plant 
closures, we need to approximate local labor and energy markets as 
closely as possible. For example, to test the extent to which high wages 
increase the probability a plant will close, we need to approximate wages 
faced by the plant in question. Wage rates in the SMSA where the plant 
is located are a reasonable measure of wages paid by the plant. Statewide 
wages are not a satisfactory measure, since wages vary substantially 
within states, especially within larger states such as California.
Independent Variables
The five hypotheses are tested with the following independent 
variables.
Production Costs Levels
In order to test hypothesis 1, that plant closures are more probable 
in high production cost areas, we need to identify production costs that 
vary across the regions of the United States. Production costs that vary 
spatially are wages, energy, and taxes. While taxes are not a major ex 
pense for the average manufacturer, they are included here because of 
their role in the debate over the causes of plant closures.
Next to materials, labor costs are the largest expense for the average 
manufacturing establishment. For example, payroll and supplemental
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labor costs, including such employee benefits as pension programs, 
unemployment insurance, health benefits, etc., consume 44 percent of 
revenue in the metalworking machinery industry, 36 percent of revenue 
in the electronic components industry, and 18 percent of revenue in 
the motor vehicle industry (U.S. Department of Commerce 1977b, tables 
3a and 3b). No other production expense aside from raw materials is 
as large.
To demonstrate the spatial variation in wages, table 4.1 reports wages 
for production workers in 1977 in selected states, by region. While the 
statistical test of the model uses data on SMSAs, state data are used 
here to condense information. In 1980, there were 318 SMSAs in the 
United States, and even though not all have employment in these three 
industries, wage data presented by SMSA would be unmanageable. Table 
4.1 shows that in 1977 the Mid-Atlantic and East North Central states 
had wages above the national average. The New England, South Atlantic, 
and East South Central states had wages below the national average.
The SMSA-level wage data used in this study are taken from the Cen 
sus of Manufactures and are average hourly wages at the 3-digit SIC 
level for production workers. The range of wage values for the industries 
and SMSAs used in this study are reported in appendix 4.2.
Energy is another input to the production process whose costs vary 
across the country. Compared to labor, however, energy costs are a 
small proportion of the average establishment's revenues in the three 
industries studied here. For example, purchased fuels and purchased 
electric energy are approximately 1 percent of revenues in the metalwork 
ing machinery, electronic components, and motor vehicle industries 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1977b, tables 3a and 3b).
Energy costs are highest in the New England and Mid-Atlantic states 
and lowest in the South and West (see table 4.1). Electricity costs are 
low in the Pacific region due to this region's abundance of hydroelec 
tric power. The Tennessee Valley Authority is responsible for keeping 
electricity costs relatively low in the East South Central region. For 
the range of values for SMSAs used in this study, see appendix 4.2.
Energy costs are measured as the "typical" monthly electricity bills 
for industrial users in the 300 kilowatt hour (KWH), 120,000 megawatt 
hour (MWH) category. The 300 KWH refers to the amount of electricity
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Table 4.1
Indices of Wages, Electric and Other Fuel Costs, 
Taxes, and Union Membership for 26 Selected States by Region
1977 wages8 
production workers 
SIC SIC SIC 
State 354 367 371
Other
Electric fuels % Union 
cost" costb Taxesc labord

























































































































































































































SOURCES: 7977 Census of Manufactures, table 5, volume HI, part 1 and 2; U.S. Department 
of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Energy Price and Expenditure Report, 1970-1981, 
DOE/EIA-0376 (81), June 1984; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administra 
tion, State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates 1960-83, DOE/EIA-0214 (83) section 
4, May 1985; William Wheaton (1983) "Interstate Differences in the Level of Business Taxa 
tion," National Tax Journal, 36, 1, pp. 83-94; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2070, December 1980, table 166. 
a. Average Production Wage in state divided by National Average Wage, 
b. Index for "other fuels" calculated using data for the states on the price of petroleum, coal, 
and natural gas in dollars per million BTUs and weighted by the consumption of each fuel by state, 
c. Index of business taxes paid by the manufacturing sector as a percent of all manufacturing income, 
d. Union membership as a percent of nonagricultural employment by state, 1978. 
NA=not available.
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used and the 120,000 MWH category refers to the intensity of the power. 
The important factor here is that energy costs are measured as the bill 
the same manufacturer would pay in different cities across the coun 
try, if its use of energy was exactly the same in each city .We use only 
electricity costs because of the relative ease of collecting these data for 
SMSAs and because the major share of energy in our three industries 
comes from this source. Sixty-eight percent of energy expenditures in 
metal working machinery was for electricity. The comparable figures 
for electronic components and motor vehicles are 78 percent and 57 
percent. The remaining shares of energy expenditures are spread among 
fuel oils, coals, coke and breeze, and natural gas (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1977a).
Business taxes are an additional production cost that varies by area 
of the country. The business tax burden includes property, corporate 
income, unemployment, payroll, insurance, and stock transfer taxes and 
general license or business fees. Wheaton (1983) estimates business taxes 
to be an average of 8 percent of net business income. Taxes as a share 
of business revenues, the estimate comparable to the wage and energy 
figures presented above, is not available. In the same paper, Wheaton 
estimated state tax burdens for 1977 by summing up all business tax 
payments by each state's manufacturing sector and dividing this value 
by the state's business income in manufacturing. An index of his 
estimates is found in table 4.1. In general, the index shows tax burdens 
to be relatively high in New England and the Mid-Atlantic, and in 
Michigan, Illinois, and California. The tax burdens in the West North 
Central, South Atlantic, and East South Central regions are relatively 
low. The state ratios calculated by Wheaton are used in this study. State 
tax rates rather than SMSA rates are used because these business taxes 
are levied at the state level and therefore do not vary within the state. 
Because wages are the most important input, we should expect closures 
to be more sensitive to variations in wages than either energy costs or 
taxes.
Unionization
Rates of union membership also vary spatially, with workers in the 
industrialized North and West most likely to be represented by unions.
Regional Rates of Profit 83
Approximately one-third of nonagricultural employees are represented 
by unions in these two regions. The lowest rates of union representa 
tion are in the West South Central and South Atlantic regions (see table 
4.1).
If the level of unionization influences disinvestment in any industry, 
the three industries studied here would be among them. National data 
on the proportion of workers covered by unions are not available at 
the 3-digit level of industrial detail. However, the data at the 2-digit 
level indicate all three industries may have above-average rates of union 
participation. Twenty-nine percent of machinery production workers 
(SIC 35) are unionized. Thirty-six percent of electronics and electrical 
production machinery workers (SIC 36) are represented by unions and 
57 percent of transportation production workers (SIC 37) are union 
members.
For purposes of this study, unionization is measured as the percent 
of the nonagricultural labor force belonging to unions. These data are 
not available at the metropolitan level of disaggregation, and, therefore, 
the state level data, reported in table 4.1, are used.
Production Cost Changes
Hypothesis 3 predicts greater declines in profit levels, and therefore 
a greater probability of plant closures, in areas with above-average in 
creases in production costs. Inputs whose costs changed relative to the 
U.S. average over the period of study include wages and energy costs.
For the three industries studied here, as well as all manufacturing, 
cross-regional differences in wages have narrowed. The largest relative 
wage increases have been in the rapidly growing regions of the U.S. 
Wages in the stagnating or slow-growth regions have dropped relative 
to the national average wage (see table 4.2). A positive value in table 
4.2 signifies an increase in the state's position relative to the U.S. 
average, while a negative value means a decrease in the state relative 
to the U.S. average.
Energy price increases over the 1975-81 period have also favored 
producers in the Mid-Atlantic and some of the East North Central, as 
well as South Atlantic states. Price increases were greatest in Califor 
nia, Texas, and New Hampshire (table 4.2). The above-average price
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Table 4.2
Changes in the Indices for Production Wages 1977-82 and for Electric 
and Other Fuels Cost 1975-81 for 26 Selected States by Region
Change in wages (1977-82)8 
SIC SIC SIC 

















































































































































SOURCES: Census of Manufactures, 1977 and 1982, table 5, vol. ffl; U.S. Department of Energy, 
Energy Information Administration, State Energy Price and Expenditure Report, 1970-1981, 
DOE/EIA-0376 (81), June 1984, and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administra 
tion, State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1983, DOE/EIA-0214 (83), sec 
tion 4, May 1985.
a. These numbers are calculated by subtracting the 1977 Wage Index Value, shown in table 1, 
from the 1982 index value (not shown).
b. These numbers are calculated by subtracting the 1975 values, shown in table 1, from the 1981 
index value (not shown).
c. Index for "other fuels" calculated using data for the states on the price of petroleum, coal, 
and natural gas in dollars per million BTUs and weighted by the consumption of each fuel by state. 
NA=not available.
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increase in Texas is explained by this state's dependence on natural gas 
and the decontrol of natural gas prices during this period. While 
petroleum prices increased at an annual average rate of 18 percent per 
year, between 1975 and 1981, natural gas increases averaged 22 per 
cent per year. Sixty percent of the West South Central's energy for in 
dustrial uses comes from natural gas.
The variables used in this study are the change in the average hourly 
industry wage between 1977 and 1982. The change in energy costs are 
the change in a typical electricity bill for an industrial user using 300 
KWH in the 120,000 MWH category from 1978 to 1982. Because of 
the difficulty of locating an index for all business taxes for two periods, 
and the relatively small proportion of total costs attributable to taxes, 
the change in tax burden is not included in the model. Again, the range 
of values for the included SMSAs, is reported in appendix 4.2.
Import Penetration
To measure the extent to which a plant is adversely affected by im 
ports, we selected two proxies. One is the plant's 4-digit line of business. 
We expect that the greater the import penetration in the plant's 4-digit 
industry, the greater the loss in revenues and profits, and the greater 
the probability a plant in that industry will close. Table 4.3 reports the 
4-digit industries within metalworking machinery, electronic com 
ponents, and motor vehicles, and ranks them by the extent to which 
imports in each industry are replacing domestic production.
Two measures of import competition are reported in table 4.3. The 
first column, the annual growth rate in imports, measures the rate at 
which imports are growing. Because this measure does not take into 
account the growth in domestic demand, it may not accurately repre 
sent import penetration. Therefore, table 4.3 also includes a second in 
dicator of import penetration. The second column of table 4.3 measures 
the growth rate in the ratio of imports to domestic production (value 
of shipments), weighted by imports' share of value of shipments. This 
value measures the rate at which imports are replacing domestic pro 
duction, accounting for the proportion of imports in the industry at the 
beginning of the period.
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Table 4.3
Import Growth Rates by 4-Digit SIC Codes, 





Growth rate in the ratio of
imports to value of
shipments, weighted by
imports share of value of
shipments in 1975
(1975-1980)
Metalworking machinery (SIC 354)
3541-Metal cutting 12.94
3542-Metal forming 8.71
3546-Power hand tools 11.72










3677-Coils & transformers .00
3678-Connectors 2.00
Motor vehicles (SIC 371)
3711-Bodies 8.07



















SOURCES: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, U.S. Imports, Consumption and General 
SIC-Based Products by World Areas, 1982, table 1, May 1983; and U.S. Imports for Consump 
tion and General Imports, 1975, table 1, May 1976. 
a. Includes motor homes (SIC 3716) along with truck and bus bodies.
Table 4.3 indicates variation in import penetration across 4-digit SIC 
industries within SICs 354, 367, and 371. For example, in the 
metal working machinery industry, imports are cutting into domestic
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production in all industries except SIC 3549 N.E.C. (not elsewhere 
classified) and SIC 3545 Accessories. The annual growth rate in im 
ports is greatest in SIC 3541 metal cutting machinery. SICs 3675 and 
3711 are experiencing the greatest competition from imports in the re 
maining two 3-digit industries.
The 4-digit industries enter the model as dummy variables, with SICs 
3541, 3671, and 3711 as the reference industries. If import competi 
tion is one cause of plant closures, we would expect to see statistically 
significant and negative values for the coefficients on the dummy 
variables on industries experiencing less import competition (smaller 
numbers in column 2 of table 4.3) than that of the reference industries.
A second measure of import competition is the percent of the local 
labor force with more than a high school education. Even within 4-digit 
industrial categories, there is still a wide variety of manufacturing ac 
tivities, some requiring specialized, highly skilled labor and others re 
quiring low-skilled assembly. The low-skilled assembly operations are 
hypothesized to be most affected by foreign competition and plant 
closures.
As a proxy for skill level in manufacturing, we use the percent of 
the SMSA labor force having 12 years of schooling or more. The 
hypothesis is that plants producing a standardized product with a low- 
skilled labor force, and consequently vulnerable to imports and closure, 
will be concentrated in locations with a large labor force with little educa 
tion. The percent of the labor force with a high school education ranges 
from 48.2 for New Bedford, Massachusetts to 81.7 percent for Seat 
tle, Washington.
Demand for Output
Three variables are used to measure demand for a plant's output. Two 
measures of local demand are considered, however this variable is 
measured differently for each of the three industries. The market for 
metalworking machinery is primarily other manufacturers. Metal working 
machines are generally specialized products designed for a specific 
manufacturer. Since face-to-face contact is often required, machinery 
shops are small scale and serve a local clientele (Trainer 1979). Thus,
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local market growth is expected to play a significant role in the pro 
fitability of metal working machinery plants. This variable in the machine 
tool equation is measured by the rate of manufacturing employment 
growth in the plant's SMSA.
The electronic components industry produces intermediate products 
for local and national markets and final goods primarily for national 
markets. Although local final demand is not expected to be particular 
ly important for the electronics industry, the percentage increase in 
population in the plant's SMSA is included here. To capture local in 
termediate demand, the percentage increase in manufacturing employ 
ment in the plant's SMSA is included.
The motor vehicle industry primarily produces final goods for local 
and national markets. While motor vehicle plants most frequently serve 
a national market, assembly plants are situated near markets. Therefore, 
to capture local demand, we include the population growth rate in a 
plant's SMSA.
For the above variables, manufacturing changes cover the years 1975 
to 1982. Population changes cover the years 1970 to 1980. For the 
SMSAs included in our sample, manufacturing employment growth rang 
ed from -4.85 percent per annum in Youngstown, Pennsylvania to 10.21 
percent in San Jose, California. Population growth rates varied between 
-.9 percent per annum in Jersey City, New Jersey to 5.0 percent per 
annum in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
National market demand is captured in the same 4-digit SIC dummy 
variables reported above under import penetration. This approach was 
taken to attempt to distinguish between the two hypotheses, given the 
limited plant specific data. If the dummy variables on industries with 
strong import penetration are significantly different from zero and 
positive, then there is support for the import penetration hypothesis. 
If the dummy variables on industries experiencing the slowest growth 
are significantly different from zero and of the correct expected sign, 
then there is support for the hypothesis that national market demand 
influences closures.
Table 4.4 reports the growth in output (value of shipments) for each 
of the 4-digit industries. If greater industry growth in output reduces
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the probability a plant in that industry will close, we would expect 
positive values on the dummy coefficients for industries growing slower 
than the reference industry and negative values for the industries growing 
faster than the reference industry. For example, support for this 
hypothesis would be indicated by negative values on the dummy coef 
ficients for SICs 3545, 3546, and 3549 and positive values on the dummy 
coefficients for SICs 3542, 3547, and 3544 in the metal working 
machinery industry.
Table 4.4
Growth in Value of Shipments for 4-Digit SIC Categories 
Ranked by Growth Rate
Growth rate in value shipments,
constant dollars, 1970-80 
SIC code (annual average percent)
Metalworking machinery
3542 (Metal forming) .48
3547 (Rolling mill machinery) .42b
3544 (Special dies) .90
3541 (Metal cutting machinery) 2.88
3545 (Accessories) 4.90
3546 (Power hand tools) 5.50b
3549 (N.E.C.) 7.28b
Electronic components
3671 (Electronic tubes) .05
3677 (Coils and transformers .43b
3676 (Resistors) 1.83b





3711 (Motor vehicles bodies) -1.95b
3714 (Parts and accessories) .28
3715 (Truck trailers) 4.80 
3713 (Trucks and bus bodies)3 5.04
SOURCES: Census of Manufactures, 7977 ami Annual Survey of Manufactures, 1980.
a. Includes motor homes (SIC 3716).
b. 1972 to 1980 annual average growth rates, 1970 data were not available.
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The 4-digit industries exhibiting slow output growth and intense foreign 
competition are correlated. Therefore, it may not be possible to 
distinguish between the hypotheses on import penetration and market 
demand on the basis of this variable. Rather, if import penetration is 
an important factor in plant closures, we will expect both the 4-digit 
SIC code and the education variables to be significant.
Control Variables—Size, Age, and Status
As discussed in chapter 3, a plant's size, age, and status are expected 
to influence the probability of its closure. Larger firms and establishments 
are expected to close at lower rates than smaller firms and establishments. 
Younger firms are expected to close at higher rates than well-established 
firms, and branch plants and subsidiaries are expected to close at higher 
rates than independents and headquarters. The rationale for including 
each of these control variables is discussed in depth in chapter 3.
The Impact of Industry Characteristics
As argued above, an industry's rate of technological change, rate of 
growth in product demand, and market structure should influence its 
sensitivity to several of the above variables. First, plants experiencing 
technological change and improvements in labor productivity should 
be particularly sensitive to unionization in their plant closure patterns. 
This should result in larger coefficients on the unionization variable 
in the industries experiencing the greatest rate of technological change.
While all three of the industries studied here (machinery manufac 
turing (SIC 354), electronic components (SIC 367), and motor vehicles 
(SIC 371)) are experiencing some employment growth, only electronic 
components can be characterized as experiencing rapid technological 
change. Productivity growth in the machine tool industry has been slug 
gish, with 1 to 2 percent annual increases in output per employee hour 
over the period 1975 to 1982 (Belitsky 1983). The reason for little 
technological adoption of new production processes in this industry is 
that most firms are small, single-plant operations that cannot afford ex 
pensive new capital equipment. For example, in SIC 3544, metal
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cutting machinery, there are 7100 establishments with an average of 
15 employees in each. Numerically controlled machine tools, the ma 
jor technological advance in machine tool production, would replace 
labor, reduce scrap, and increase precision, but they are too costly to 
be affordable for most machine tool firms. Consequently, only 3 
percent of metal cutting machine tools are numerically controlled 
(Belitsky 1983).
While the electronic components (SIC 367) group includes diverse 
industries, overall technological change has been rapid, leading to large 
increases in worker productivity. Over the period 1967 to 1980, out 
put per employee hour increased by 8.8 percent annually in the elec 
tronics industry (Critchlow 1983b). Improvements in assembly line pro 
cedures and automation of many tasks are changing the skill requirements 
and increasing worker productivity. Assembly jobs, the largest occupa 
tional category, are being lost to machine monitoring, feeding, loading, 
unloading, and maintenance. Demand for solderers, technicians, and 
drafters has also declined, while demand for scientists and engineers 
has increased.
Technological change in the auto industry has been slow, relative to 
that of electronics. From 1975 to 1982, output per employee hour for 
production employees increased by 1.8 percent per year (U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor 1983, p. 219). While this industry has mechanized much 
of its assembly line operations, the most common technological changes 
over the period of study here have been in computerized auto styling 
and design and computerizing inventory management, such as using 
computers to keep track of parts and production materials, and 
forecasting parts shortages.
Earlier, we hypothesized that firms adopting new technologies may 
find it is easier to close existing plants and adopt new production pro 
cesses in a new plant, rather than attempt to accommodate new 
technologies in an existing unionized plant. If true, we would expect 
closures in electronic components plants to be more sensitive to unioniza 
tion than closures in metal working machinery and motor vehicles. Sup 
port for this hypothesis would show up in larger coefficients on the 
unionization variable in the electronic components equation than the 
motor vehicle and machine tool equations.
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Second, industry rates of growth are also expected to influence regional 
plant closure patterns. Reductions in capacity are expected to be con 
centrated in plants located in high-cost regions. In fast-growth industries, 
high-cost plants are also expected to close at higher rates than low-cost 
plants, but because the capacity at high-cost plants may be needed to 
meet excess demand, the closure rates are not expected to be as high 
as for declining industries. These differences should show up as larger 
coefficients on the production cost variables in a declining (motor 
vehicles) than a growing (electronic components) industry.
Third, cross-industry differences in market structure should also in 
fluence the size of the coefficients across the three industries studied 
here. All three industries studied here face competition for markets and 
therefore are expected to be responsive to the variables outlined above. 
However, in the case of motor vehicles, which was an oligopoly until 
the late 1970s, plant closures are expected to be particularly sensitive 
to high production costs and unionization.
Markusen (1985) argues that when oligopolies emerge early in the 
evolution of an industrial sector, pricing practices, restrictions in out 
put, and product differentiation result in the spatial concentration of 
production. This spatial concentration is not the result of a least cost 
calculus, as Markusen demonstrates for the case of steel, and exists 
because higher costs are easily passed on to consumers. Once the 
oligopolist's market is eroded, either through the development of 
substitutes, or, as in the case of autos, through competition from abroad, 
"oligopolists have the incentive, resources, and know-how to rationalize 
and restructure very rapidly with devastating consequences for tradi 
tional centers" (p. 12). If Markusen's argument holds for the auto in 
dustry, we would expect to see very high closure rates in the high-cost, 
unionized plants, which are located in the traditional centers of 
automobile production. This would show up as large, positive, and 
statistically significant coefficients on the variables for labor costs, energy 
costs, and taxes.
Summary of the Equation to be Estimated
Five hypotheses are to be tested with 16 independent variables. An 
establishment is more likely to close (1) the higher the level of labor,
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tax, and utility costs, (2) the more unionized the local labor force, (3) the 
greater the increase in local labor and energy costs relative to the na 
tional average cost increase, (4) the lower the percent of the labor force 
with a high school degree and the greater the competition from imports, 
and (5) the greater the decline in product demand in local and national 
markets. Several additional variables that influence the probability a 
plant will close, including the plant's status as an independent, head 
quarters, branch, or subsidiary, the plant's age, and the plant's size, 
are included in the model to hold these factors constant. The final equa 
tion to be estimated is: 
(4) PCj = a0 + a l Wages + a2Energy s + a3Taxs
+ a4Unions + <x5ChWages + a6ChEnergy s
+ ex7HSs + aglj + «9Manus + a 10PopChs
+ a j jHdquarterSj + a12Subsidiaryj
+a13Branchi +a14Sizei +a15Agei
where 
PC = A binary variable, where PC = 1 if the plant closed between 1975
and 1982 and 0 if the plant remained in business. 
Wage = Average hourly wage rate for production workers in the 3-digit
SIC code industry between 1977 and 1982. 
Energy =A "typical" monthly utility bill between 1975 and 1981. 
Tax = Percent of business income spent on business taxes in 1977. 
Union = Percent of the nonagricultural labor force in unions, 1978. 
ChWage=Change in wages, 1977 to 1982. 
ChEnergy= Change in energy costs, 1975 to 1981. 
HS= Percent of the labor force with a high school degree, 1980. 
I = Dummy variable representing the industry's 4-digit SIC code. 
Manu= Percentage change in manufacturing employment, 1975 to
1982.
PopCh= Percentage change in population, 1970 to 1980. 
Hdquarters= Dummy variable with 1 = headquarters and 0 if not. 
Subsidiary = Dummy variable with 1= subsidiary and 0 if not. 
Branch = Dummy variable with 1= branch and 0 if not. 
Size = Size of establishment in number of employees. 
Age = Age of establishment (only available for single-plant firms).
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New=Dummy variable if firm was established after 1969 (only
available for single-plant firms). 
s=Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
i=Plant.
Results
The results are reported in tables 4.5 through 4.7. The equations for 
each industry were estimated for all establishments and for branches 
and independents separately. Branches and independents were estimated 
separately for several reasons. First, it allows for the possibility that 
the slopes of the coefficients vary by type of establishment. For exam 
ple, the Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission (1983) survey 
found closures of branches to be more sensitive to production costs than 
closures of independents. Second, separate equations allow us to check 
for biases caused by faulty data. As shown in chapter 2, there is evidence 
the data on the dependent variable is more accurate for branches than 
for independents. Third, a separate model for independents (single-plant 
firms) also permits the effects of a firm's age to be held constant. As 
noted above, the D&B data do not include the age of branch plants.
To capture more homogeneous industrial categories, the establishments 
used in the following models are only those that identified the given 
industry as its first line of business. There were 46 SMSAs with 
metalworking machinery establishments for which a complete set of 
data could be compiled. There were a total of 6,303 establishments in 
these 46 SMSAs in 1975, 1,573 of which closed over the 1975 to 1982 
period. The results for the electronic components industry (table 4.6) 
are based on 1,083 establishments in 36 SMSAs. Of these 1,083 
establishments, 397 closed over the 1975 to 1982 period. There were 
23 SMSAs with motor vehicle establishments and a complete set of data. 
There were 1,358 establishments in these 23 SMSAs, 457 of which clos 
ed over the period under study. See appendix 4.3 for a list of the SMSAs 
included in the analysis and the number of plants in each SMSA.
The findings demonstrate little support for the hypotheses that local 
economic variables are responsible for plant closures. For example, 
in the machine tool industry equation, the only coefficient statistically
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significant at the 5 percent level of confidence is the manufacturing 
growth rate (Manu), and the sign is positive rather than the expected 
negative. A positive sign indicates that the faster the growth in local 
manufacturing employment, the more likely a metalworking establish 
ment will close, a result inconsistent with the hypotheses set forth earlier.
In logit analysis, the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted. 
Therefore, the elasticities (the increase in the probability of a closure 
given a 100 percent increase in the independent variable) are calculated 
for the significant variables. These elasticities are relevant only when 
all other variables take on their mean value. For example, the value 
in the brackets [ ] under the coefficient on the local manufacturing 
growth rate (Manu) can be interpreted to mean that a 100 percent in 
crease in the manufacturing growth rate leads to a 1 percent increase 
in the probability a plant will close, when all other variables are at their 
mean value.
The one variable that is significant at the 10 percent level and of the 
correct sign is wages (Wage) in the equation for independent electronic 
components firms (see table 4.6). Independent electronic component 
firms are more likely to close in areas where wage levels are high. The 
value in brackets is interpreted to mean that a 100 percent increase in 
the wage level results in a 12 percent increase in the probability an in 
dependent will close, when all other independent variables are at their 
mean value.
In the cases where other variables are statistically significant, the signs 
are the opposite of those expected. For example, table 4.7 reports a 
positive sign on the coefficient for the percent of the population with 
a high school degree, indicating a greater probability of a motor vehi 
cle plant closing where the labor force is better educated. In addition, 
the same table shows a negative but significant sign on the coefficient 
for taxes in the equation for independents. This indicates that the prob 
ability of a firm closing is lower in high-tax SMSAs.
Further, there are no statistically significant differences in the prob 
ability of a plant's closing across 4-digit industries, even though there 
are wide variations in the extent to which imports are cutting into the 
domestic production and wide variations in their rates of output growth 
(see tables 4.3 and 4.4). For example, if serious import penetration
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Table 4.5
Effects of Economic Variables on Plant Closures











(Metal forming machine tools)




































































































Fraction of pairs where 




























* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of a plant closing occurring given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variable.
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Table 4.6
Effects of Economic Variables on Plant Closures
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* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of a plant closing occurring given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variable.
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Table 4.7
Effects of Economic Variables on Plant Closures
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SIC 3714 
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* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of a plant closing occurring given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variable.
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resulted in high industry closing rates we would expect industry 3711 
(motor vehicles and car bodies) to experience high rates of closure. This 
would show up in table 4.7 as negative and significant coefficients for 
SIC 3713 (truck and bus bodies and motor homes) and SIC 3714 (motor 
vehicle parts), since these latter two industries are less affected by im 
port competition than SIC 3711.
The absence of evidence of an association between industry closure 
rates and industry growth rates is similar to findings from plant closing 
studies in Great Britain. Healey (1982), in a study of the textile and 
clothing industries, found no relationship between closure rates and in 
dustry growth rates, and in studies of Ireland (O'Farrell 1976), the East 
Midlands (Gudgin 1978), and Scotland (Henderson 1979), researchers 
found no significant correlation between the same variables.
There are at least three possible explanations for this result. One, 
low rates of start-ups and expansions may pick up the adjustments when 
an industry declines, much the same pattern as that shown for regional 
growth in chapter 3. A second, though not mutually exclusive, explana 
tion is that there are differences across industries in the adjustment to 
decline and no relationship between the variables the rate of plant closures 
and industry growth exists. For example, healthy firms in growing in 
dustries may exhibit high rates of closure because they have sufficient 
profits to invest in research and development and to adopt new 
technologies. The ability to adopt new technologies may lead to plant 
closures as older, redundant plants are closed. These high closure rates 
in fast-growth industries may offset a high rate in declining industries.
In all three industries, a plant's status has the greatest impact on the 
probability a plant will close. Headquarters close at about the same rate 
as independents. In the metal working machinery industry, the probability 
a branch will close is 32 percent greater than the probability a single- 
plant firm will close. The probability of a subsidiary closing (including 
headquarters and branches) is 17 percent higher than for an indepen 
dent. Both of these variables are significant at high levels of confidence 
in all three equations. As chapter 2 pointed out, the data overestimate 
closures in independents and give a more accurate reading of branch 
plant than independent closures. Even given the overestimate of indepen 
dent closures, the coefficient on branch plants is positive, highly signifi 
cant, and large.
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Size also has an impact on the probability a plant will close, with 
larger establishments in both the metalworking machinery and motor 
vehicle industries less likely to close. Interpreting the result from the 
metalworking machinery industry, every 100 percent increase in size 
reduces the probability a plant will close by 0.3 percent. The findings 
on size for this industry can be explained by the tendency for large in 
dependents to be less likely to close. This variable is insignificant for 
branches (table 4.5).
Tables 4.5 through 4.7 also indicate new firms are more likely to 
close than older firms. New firms are defined as those started after 1969. 
Only in the metalworking machinery industry is there evidence older 
firms are more likely to close than younger firms, where every 100 
percent increase in age increases the probability a machine tool firm 
will close by 0.1 percent. The significance and positive values for both 
(Age) and (New) in the metalworking machinery equation for in 
dependents indicates the impact of age on the probability a firm will 
close is a "U"-shaped function with high probabilities of closure for 
very young and very old metalworking manufacturing firms, and lower 
probabilities for middle-aged metalworking machinery firms.
In both the electronic components and motor vehicle equations, very 
young plants are most likely to close. However, there is no evidence 
that age influences the likelihood of closure for firms older than five 
years. These results can be explained by the tendency for metalwork 
ing machinery firms to be small single-plant operations that close when 
the owner retires. The other two industries are comprised primarily of 
firms with a corporate form of management.
The dependent variable in the previous models included both clos 
ings and out-of-state relocations. We estimate a similar model, including 
only relocations. The number of relocations was too small in both the 
electronic components and motor vehicle industries to yield meaningful 
results. However, the model could be estimated for the metalworking 
machinery industry. These results are reported in table 4.8, and indicate 
headquarters and subsidiaries and plants located where labor unions are 
well organized are the most likely to relocate to another state. This find 
ing supports the hypothesis that plants leave regions to avoid dealing 
with a unionized labor force.
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Table 4.8
Effects of Economic Variables on Relocations 
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* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence or greater.
( ) Chi-square statistics.
[ ] The increase in the probability of an out of state relocation given a 100 percent increase in
the corresponding independent variables.
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The finding that headquarters are more likely to relocate than 
branches (table 4.8) should be interpreted judiciously, since D&B is 
much more likely to record a relocating headquarters correctly than a 
relocating branch. As discussed in chapter 2, many relocating 
branches are probably recorded as a closing and a subsequent start-up 
in a new location. Table 4.8 offers no support, however, for the fre 
quently argued position that high wages, taxes, and energy bills are driv 
ing plants out of the northern states.
Conclusions
The evidence from the metal working machinery, electronic com 
ponents, and motor vehicles industries does not support the hypotheses 
that regional differences in production cost levels, level of unioniza 
tion, production cost changes, import penetration, and local market 
growth lead to regional differences in rates of plant closures. This result 
helps explain the absence of regional variations in plant closure rates 
and rates of job loss reported in chapter 3. There are several possible 
explanations.
One explanation is that the independent variables affect a plant's pro 
fitability with a lag. We measured the level and change in variables 
over the period 1975 to 1982, the same years as covered by the plant 
closing data. The plant closing decision may reflect economic condi 
tions from an earlier time period.
A second explanation is that plant closing decisions are not affected 
by the characteristics of the regions where the plants are located and 
that the decision to close a plant, once the plant's status, age, and size 
are held constant is an idiosyncratic event or affected by factors that 
occur randomly across regions. These latter two conclusions are con 
sistent with the case studies conducted by Massey and Meegan (1982) 
in Great Britain.
A third explanation for the finding that the characteristics of a plant's 
location do not have an impact on the plant closing decision is that, 
unlike the decision to open a plant, the decision to close a plant may 
be influenced by political and longer run economic variables. For ex-
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ample, when there are other options for cutting back on capacity, a 
manager may decide against closing a heavily unionized plant or a plant 
in a depressed community because of fear of adverse attention from 
the media or consumers, or because the owner feels a responsibility 
to the community. Schmenner found occasions where closing decisions 
were made on grounds other than short-run profitability:
With both costs and with social responsibility in mind, some 
companies have modified their decisions regarding plant clos 
ings from what might be termed a rigid financial accounting 
approach. The most common modification—one that is seen 
as the most equitable one amid a distasteful situation—is to 
close the least senior plant (1982, p. 236).
This strategy guided Texas Instrument's only plant closing during the 
1973-75 recession in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida.
A fourth possibility is that the model misses an important interven 
ing variable, i.e., competition from other producers. Evidence from 
chapter 3 demonstrates that plants located in regions with shrinking 
markets and high production costs are competing in a less intense en 
vironment, reducing the likelihood a plant will close. As profit rates 
in a region (and/or industry) fall, new investment is deflected to lower 
cost regions or to higher profit industries (Engle 1974; Carlton 1979). 
Entrepreneurs shift their attention away from the less profitable market, 
leaving a less competitive environment to existing producers.
In their case studies of job loss, Massey and Meegan (1982) found 
two instances where competition was an important consideration in the 
plant closing decision. Iron casting foundries located in regions with 
little competition operated relatively inefficient plants. Plants located 
in regions with more intense competition were more efficient, but also 
more likely to close. They report a similar finding for the newsprint 
industry. Newsprint companies, faced with excess capacity, chose to 
adjust by closing plants located in competitive markets and to continue 
operating plants where the company held a monopoly position. Market 
competition was not included in the model presented in this chapter.
The characteristics of regional economies have been a good predic 
tor of where new firms locate. Plants locate where wages and energy 
costs are relatively low, an appropriately skilled labor force is available,
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and agglomeration economies exist. Regional characteristics do not, 
however, appear to influence the geography of plant closures. The on 
ly factors that appear to influence the closure decision are attributes 
of a plant, such as its status, age, and size. The findings of chapter 4 
reinforce the conclusion of chapter 3, that plant closing rates are un- 
correlated with economic growth. Spatial variations in economic growth 
appear to be explained by high plant start-up and expansion rates in 
the fast-growth regions, rather than low rates of plant closures.
Because plant closures occur at roughly even rates in all regions of 
the country, worker displacement may be a serious issue in the fast- 
growth as well as the slow-growth economies. In chapter 5, we explore 
the extent to which regions with strong employment growth absorb the 
workers permanently laid off. Do displaced workers face difficult labor 
market adjustment in all regions of the country, or is displacement 
primarily a problem concentrated in labor markets where there is in 
sufficient job creation?
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Appendix 4.1 
Sources of Data
Average Hourly Wages by Industry, 1977 and 1982: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1977, table 6 and Census of Manufac 
tures, 1982, table 6.
Union Membership, 1976: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract, 1979, table no. 705, p. 427.
Electricity Rates, 1978 and 1982: United States Department of Energy, Energy Infor 
mation Administration, Typical Electric Bills, January 1,1978, table 11, August 1978, 
pp. 166-185; and Typical Electric Bills, January 1,1982, table 19, October 1982, pp. 
284-309.
Years of High School and College Completed, 1980: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Population Census, 1980, table 119, Educational Characteristics 
for Areas and Places.
Business Taxes on Manufacturing, 1977: Wheaton, William (1983) "Interstate Dif 
ferences in the Level of Business Taxation," National Tax Journal, 36,1, March, p. 89.
Population Changes, 1970-80: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982, table A.
Change in Manufacturing Employment, 1975 to 1982: U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, 22,11, May 1976, table 1, pp. 
126-134 and Employment and Earnings, 31,5, May 1984, table 1, pp. 125-140.
Appendix 4.2
Range of Values of Independent Variables 
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Appendix 4.3
Number of Establishments Included in Logit Model 




















New York, NY-NJ 407 89 88
Newark 243 37 22
Paterson—Clifton-Passaic, NJ 116 25























SIC 354 SIC 367 SIC 371






Minneapolis-St.Paul 113 16 35




Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood 42 9
Greensboro—Winston-Salem—
High Point 13 
Miami 36 6 
Raleigh-Durham, NC 1 
Tampa-St. Petersburg 32 7 
Washington, DC 22 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton 6 
East South Central
Louisville, KY-IN 9 
Memphis 20 
Nashville 35 16 
West South Central
Dallas-Fort Worth 57 37 55 
Houston 41 27 
Oklahoma City 28 
San Antonio 15 
Mountain
Denver 40 19 
Phoenix 17 
Pacific
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove 70 82 
Los Angeles-Long Beach 505 177 341 
Portland, OR 39 40 
San Diego 25 39 
San Francisco-Oakland 78 27 62 
San Jose 29 135 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc 10 
Seattle-Everett __ 10 ___
SUM 6303 1087 1358
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Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that the numbers of displaced workers 
are larger in the slow-growth industrialized states of the North, but the 
rate of labor displacement for two of the three industries and the rate 
of plant closures for all three industries are even across the regions. 
Workers in the metalworking machinery and electronic components in 
dustries located in the healthy economies of the Sun Belt are as likely 
to be displaced by a plant closing as workers in the slow-growth 
economies of the Rust Belt. These findings suggest that labor displace 
ment may be a nationwide problem.
If manufacturing workers displaced in strong labor markets are readily 
reabsorbed into the workforce, then assistance for dislocated workers 
should target depressed communities. If, however, displaced workers 
in strong, as well as weak, local economies face difficult adjustments 
and large financial losses after displacement, a nationwide strategy is 
appropriate. This issue is the focus of chapter 5.
Three questions are addressed. (1) What impact does local labor 
market growth have on the readjustment of displaced manufacturing 
workers? (2) Are there specific demographic groups who experience 
large financial losses after displacement, even when laid off in grow 
ing labor markets? (3) What impact does worker prenotification have 
on the reemployment success of displaced manufacturing workers?
As part of their Current Population Survey in January 1984, the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics identified displaced workers for the first time. We 
used this data base to explore the above issues. There are five findings. 
(1) The reemployment success of displaced manufacturing workers is
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more sensitive to local conditions in the workers' industry than to con 
ditions in the total local economy. (2) Workers displaced from locally 
declining industries experience the longest stretches of unemployment 
and the greatest declines in living standards. (3) All middle-age, blue- 
collar workers with a stable work history, even those displaced in strong 
local labor markets, experience large financial losses after displacement. 
(4) Displaced workers' reemployment success is influenced not only 
by local labor market conditions, but by the number of years worked 
prior to layoff, the state of the national economy in the year of the layoff, 
and the workers' sex, race, and occupation. (5) Workers who are 
prenotified of a closing are not, as a group, more successfully reemployed 
than those who are not prenotified.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first 
describes the Current Population Survey—Supplement on Displaced 
Workers. The second section reviews prior literature on the effect of 
labor market growth and worker demographics on reemployment. The 
third section defines a measure of the financial costs of displacement 
and the study methodology. The fourth section presents regression 
results. The fifth section discusses the role of prenotification on workers' 
reemployment success, and the final section summarizes findings.
Current Population Survey—Supplement 
on Displaced Workers
In January 1984, as a part of the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) identified workers who lost their 
jobs after January 1, 1979 as a result of a plant closing, the phase-out 
of a shift, the closure of a self-operated business, the completion of 
seasonal work, or slack work. While there is no widely accepted defini 
tion of displacement, for purposes of this study we define displaced 
workers as those who lost their jobs for the first three reasons given 
above. This definition was chosen because it is unlikely that a worker 
laid off because of a plant closing, the phase-out of a shift, or the failure 
of a self-operated business will be rehired at his or her old job, whereas 
workers displaced for the last two reasons may be reemployed by the
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same firm. Among those surveyed, 82 percent lost their job as the result 
of a plant closing or relocation, 15 percent as the result of the phase- 
out of a shift, and 3 percent as the result of a failure of a self-operated 
business. We also define a displaced worker as one who completed at 
least one full year on the job prior to layoff, since much of the current 
proposed plant closing legislation would require that workers be 
employed at least one year. Based on this definition, the BLS-CPS data 
indicate that slightly more than 3 million workers were displaced be 
tween January 1979 and December of 1982.
The January 1984 CPS provides information on the length of the 
displaced worker's unemployment spell, and his or her previous and 
current wage, old and new industry affiliation, age, years at the firm 
prior to layoff, education level, sex, race, and whether he or she was 
prenotified or expected the closing, along with other information. We 
supplemented these data with figures on employment gains and losses 
from 1979 to 1983 in the worker's labor market and on average week 
ly unemployment insurance payments in 1980 by state.
Shortcomings in the Data
There are a number of shortcomings in the data for the purposes of 
this study, One is that many workers, especially those displaced close 
to the 1984 survey date, did not complete their unemployment spell 
prior to the survey, making it impossible to determine the length of 
their unemployment period and their subsequent wage. A failure to cor 
rect for this truncated sample is likely to result in (1) underestimating 
the duration of the average unemployment spell, (2) overestimating the 
average postdisplacement wages, and (3) making faulty comparisons 
across workers. For example, a worker displaced in December of 1983 
and still unemployed in January of 1984 would register four weeks of 
unemployment. A worker displaced earlier in the year, who was 
unemployed for four weeks and then reemployed would register the 
same unemployment spell. The two unemployment spells should not 
be treated as equivalent. In addition, the reemployment wage among 
those displaced close to the survey date will be biased upwards. The 
most successful workers are most likely to be reemployed quickly, prior
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to the survey date, and these workers probably earn higher-than-average 
postlayoff wages.
In order to insure that most workers in our sample had a chance to 
complete their unemployment spell prior to the January 1984 survey 
date, our analysis excludes all workers laid off in 1983 and 1984. The 
years to be excluded were determined by examining the distribution 
of unemployment spells for each year of layoff. These distributions were 
done separately for each year because the length of the spells could vary 
by year, with longer spells more likely in years of a weak national 
economy. Unfortunately, the data do not include information on the 
month a worker was laid off. To be conservative, we assumed all workers 
were laid off in December of the layoff year. If all workers laid off 
in 1982 were laid off in December of 1982,75 percent would have com 
pleted their unemployment spell by the January 1984 survey date. Thus, 
these observations are included in the study. If workers displaced in 
1983 lost their jobs in December of that year, only 40 percent would 
have completed their unemployment spell as of the survey date; thus, 
these observations are excluded.
A second shortcoming of the data set is the exclusion of 
nonmetropolitan observations. The only information contained in the 
CPS on a worker's geographical location is SMSA and state of residence. 
States are too large to be used as a proxy for a labor market, thus the 
analysis is limited to SMSA residents.
Another possible shortcoming is that the CPS does not report the loca 
tion of layoff, although there is a record as to whether the worker moved. 
All movers are assigned to the city of residence at the time of the survey. 
Approximately 19 percent of displaced manufacturing workers in SMSAs 
relocated from another county or city, so the potential for bias is substan 
tial. Presumably, most migrants moved from declining areas to grow 
ing SMSAs, most likely after a prolonged and discouraging job search 
in the declining area. The resulting bias would make conditions look 
more favorable in declining areas and less favorable in growing SMSAs 
than is actually the case. To test for this possibility, the results were 
estimated with and without movers. The direction of the bias is as ex 
pected, but, as explained below, not large.
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A fourth problem is recall bias. Horvath (1982) found that when in 
dividuals are asked to recall the length of unemployment spells that oc 
curred 6 to 12 months in the past, they tend to underestimate the length 
of the spell. This suggests there is an even greater potential bias here, 
where workers are asked to recall the amount of time they were 
unemployed up to four years earlier.
Previous Literature 
Effects of Labor Market Conditions on Reemployment
Prior to the release of the January 1984 CPS, most empirical work 
on the experience of displaced workers was based on case studies (see 
Gordus, Jarley, and Ferman 1981). While pre- and postclosing surveys 
from a particular plant can illuminate many of the consequences of a 
shutdown, it is unclear to what extent the results can be generalized 
to all displaced workers. This is particularly true in the plant closing 
literature, where most cases have focused on closings in declining and 
manufacturing-dependent communities. These studies have shed a great 
deal of light on the impact of workers' age, education, race and sex 
on their reemployment success, but can tell us very little about the ad 
justments for these demographic groups in expanding local economies.
Case studies that do address the impact of labor market conditions 
on reemployment are those of the Armour and Company plant clos 
ings. The results from studies of five Armour and Company meat packing 
plant closures show the condition of the labor market in which the clos 
ings occurred had a crucial effect on the success of training and transfer 
programs (Ullman 1969). In the 1960s, Armour and Company, the 
United Packing Workers Union, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
and Workman's Union agreed to assist workers who were displaced 
as a consequence of Armour closings. Offices were set up in Forth Worth 
in 1962, Sioux City in 1963, Kansas City in 1964, Peoria in 1967, and 
Omaha in 1968 to coordinate and establish counseling services, offer 
retraining and placement programs, and provide job search support 
groups. Qualitative evaluations conducted after the five experiences
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indicated that the strength of the local labor market had a crucial effect 
on the placement records for each city (see also Shultz 1964; Conant 
1965; and Stern 1969).
In a study of displaced steel workers, Jacobson (1977), found that 
if the worker was displaced into a local labor market where the 
unemployment rate was 1.4 percentage points above the city's average 
rate, financial losses over the first six years after displacement were 
about 8 percentage points higher than average. He also found that 
younger workers' losses were particularly sensitive to the unemploy 
ment rate. Younger workers experienced negligible losses in strong labor 
markets and substantial losses in weak local markets.
A third study, by Bendick and Devine (1981), found 14.8 percent 
of workers displaced in declining SMSAs were unemployed for more 
than 26 weeks, while only 7.6 percent of workers displaced in growing 
SMSAs were unemployed for more than 26 weeks. The authors defin 
ed displaced workers as those who were unemployed for longer than 
eight weeks, actively seeking employment, and between the ages of 22 
and 54.
Podgursky and Swaim (1987), using the same CPS data used here, 
found high area unemployment levels, measured as SMSA rates for 
workers located in the largest SMSAs and state rates for all other 
workers, reduced the reemployment earnings of displaced workers. 
Unemployment was measured as the average rate between the year of 
displacement and 1984. For every 1 percent increase in the unemploy 
ment rate, postdisplacement earnings fell by between 1 and 2 percent.
Effects of Worker Characteristics on Reemployment
A large number of case studies have focused on the effects of a 
worker's age, education level, race, and sex on the postdisplacement 
adjustment.
Age
Mature workers are expected to encounter larger wage losses than 
younger workers because they have invested in job-specific human capital 
that was rewarded prior to layoff but may not be transferable to a new
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job. Age discrimination, employers' reluctance to spend resources on 
retraining and pension plans for someone with a relatively short worklife, 
and the actual or perceived inflexibility of older workers are additional 
reentry barriers for older workers. This hypothesis is supported by a 
number of studies.
Hammerman (1964) conducted case studies of five plant closings and 
reported that in four of the five cases, workers over 45 years of age 
had significantly higher unemployment rates than those below that age. 
When older workers did obtain jobs, they experienced greater losses 
in hourly earnings than did younger workers. Foltman (1968), in a study 
of the Wickwire plant closing near Buffalo, New York, found older 
workers had greater difficulty in obtaining jobs. Nine months after the 
shutdown, 83 percent of the 20-29 age bracket, 92 percent of the 30-39 
age bracket, 73 percent of the 40-49 age bracket, and only 44 percent 
of the over 50 age bracket had found new jobs. After controlling for 
education and family status, Dorsey (1967) found that age was an im 
portant variable in explaining the unemployment spell of workers laid 
off from a Mack Truck plant in Plainfield, New Jersey. Every year 
of age resulted in an average of .2 additional weeks of unemployment.
Jacobson and Thomason (1979), Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) and 
Podgursky and Swaim (1987) conducted cross-industry and cross-region 
studies of worker displacement and also found older workers experience 
larger postdisplacement losses than younger workers.
Education
Levels of formal education are also expected to affect a worker's 
postlayoff experience. More highly educated workers should achieve 
higher wages at their postdisplacement job and shorter unemployment 
spells than their less-educated counterparts. Workers with more education 
should conduct more effective job searches, make better presentations 
at an interview, be more ambitious or assertive, and be perceived by 
potential employers to be more flexible and trainable.
The evidence of a relationship between length of unemployment and 
education is mixed, but generally shows duration decreases as educa 
tion increases. In his case studies of five plant closings, Hammerman 
(1964) found that 6-21 months after shutdown, high school graduates
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experienced lower unemployment rates than those who had not com 
pleted high school. The least educated workers also took the sharpest 
cuts in wages. In the study of the Wickwire plant closing in Buffalo, 
Foltman (1968) found that nine months after the closing only 49 per 
cent of those who had not completed high school had found jobs. Of 
those who had completed high school, 79 percent had obtained jobs; 
of those who had some college education, 82 percent had found jobs. 
Foltman also reports that workers who were more educated were less 
likely to accept lower incomes when reemployed. Dorsey (1967), in 
the Mack Truck study mentioned above, found that better-educated 
workers experienced shorter unemployment spells after layoff, and a 
survey of the reemployment of workers from the Playskool plant in 
Chicago found higher placement rates for workers with high school 
diplomas (O'Connell 1985).
Race
A number of plant closing case studies report that minorities do 
relatively poorly in terms of reemployment after a permanent layoff. 
Stern (1971), in a study of displaced meat packers in Kansas City, found 
blacks made $204 less per year than whites when reemployed. Palen 
and Fancy (1968), in a study of the Studebaker plant closing in South 
Bend, Indiana, found 39.9 percent of whites and 60 percent of non- 
whites were unemployed four months after the shutdown. Aiken, Fer- 
man, and Sheppard (1968) found a similar result in their study of the 
Packard plant closing.
Sex
Similar findings are reported for women. Hammerman (1964), in his 
study mentioned above, noted female unemployment rates three times 
the rate of males; Stern (1971) reports in his study of displaced meat- 
packers that females made $2,123 less per year than males when 
reemployed; and Lipsky (1970) found that women displaced during a 
General Mills shutdown were unemployed an average 24.8 weeks, com 
pared to only 16.5 weeks for the males. Only Lipsky's study controls 
for workers' age, race, education and previous income. A similar result 
for women is reported by Jacobson and Thomason (1979), Holen, Jehn,
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and Trost (1981), and Podgursky and Swaim (1987) in their studies 
of the impact of displacement on earnings losses.
Level of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Numerous empirical studies outside the plant closing literature have 
found evidence that individuals who receive higher unemployment in 
surance (UI) benefits prolong the job search (Classen 1977; Feldstein 
1974; and Welch 1977). Consequently, in addition to labor market con 
ditions, and workers' age, education level, race and sex, we expect the 
size of a state's unemployment insurance payments to influence the length 
of the unemployment spell and the reemployment wage of displaced 
workers.
Methodology 
Estimating Financial Losses From Displacement
A displaced manufacturing worker experiences financial losses as a 
result of the unemployment spell and any wage cuts upon reemploy 
ment. We measured these financial losses as the present value of the 
predisplacement wage five years into the future subtracted from the pres 
ent value of zero wages during the unemployment spell plus the 
postdisplacement wage thereafter, continuing five years into the future.
260 260
(1) CD = E cw - E ow
i=s + l (1+r)1 i = l (1+r)1
where s=Weeks unemployed.
r=Annual discount rate of 10 percent. 
ow = Previous weekly wage. 
cw= Current weekly wage. 
CD=Cost of displacement.
i=Weeks (i=0 in week of job loss).
A 10 percent discount rate was chosen to reflect an average annual rate 
of inflation of 6.5 percent over the period 1979-1987, and a marginal
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rate of substitution between present and future consumption of 3.5 per 
cent (see Tresch 1981, p. 489). Hereafter, this variable is referred to 
as the cost of displacement (CD). A negative value signifies financial 
losses. A positive value indicates a financial gain.
The advantage of this measure of the financial costs of displacement 
is that it summarizes, in one indicator, the payoff to a worker who trades 
a longer unemployment spell for a higher-paying job. Its disadvantage 
is that its accuracy depends on the assumption a worker's prelayoff wage 
would have continued five years into the future, and the reemployment 
wage continues unchanged for up to five years (after the unemploy 
ment spell). These measurement errors probably result in an underestima 
tion of both the present value of the reemployment wage and prelay off 
wage, with the largest underestimates for younger, well-educated 
workers displaced in growing regions. This is the group most likely 
to receive wage increases with time. Figure 5.1 compares actual losses 
with those measured in this study. The gap between actual losses and 
measured losses depends upon the slopes of the earning profile, which 
are, unfortunately, unknown. 1
We also assume the 17 percent of the sample unemployed on the survey 
date will be unemployed for the whole period. For both unemployed 
and part-time workers, we assume that the value of their leisure is zero, 
which may bias financial losses upwards. An additional shortcoming 
is that the measured financial losses ignore the value of fringe benefits. 
However, this may be more than balanced by the fact that we do not 
include the value of transfers to unemployed workers. 2
The effect of local labor market conditions and worker demographics 
on the financial costs of displacement are tested with the following model. 
The variables are defined in table 5.1.
(2) CD=X0 +X 1AEs +X2IEs +X3YRLOi +X4YRWKDi
+X5AgCj+X6EDj+X7Racej -hXgSeXj -I-X^EN,,+X10OCCj.
Similar models are also tested, replacing CD with the change in nominal 
weekly wages (CWW) and the number of weeks unemployed (WKS). 
The latter two models offer insight into the reasons for financial losses. 
Are losses, for example, due to long unemployment spells or large losses 
in nominal weekly wages?
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Figure 5.1 








Reemployment date Survey date End of 
year five
Value of unemployment experience as measured in this study 
Actual value of the unemployment experience
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Table 5.1
Variables Included in the Model 
(Equation 2)
Conditions in the Local Labor Market
AE = Annual average net employment change for all industries 
January 1979 to December 1982 in thousands of jobs.
IE = Annual average net employment change, in 2-digit SIC level 
industry of displacement, 1980 to 1983 in thousands of jobs.
YRLO = Dummy variable representing the state of the national 
economy in the year laid off. Value = 1 if recession year 1980 
or 1982 and 0 if an expansionary year 1979 or 1981. 
Characteristics of the Worker
YRWKD = Years worked at that job prior to layoff.
Age =Worker's age in January 1984.
ED =Worker's years of formal education in January 1984.
Race = Dummy variable with 1= white and 0=nonwhite.
Sex = Dummy variable with 1= female and 0=male.
BEN = Average weekly unemployment insurance payment in a 
worker's state.
OCC = Dummy variable representing the worker's prelayoff occupa 
tion. Value =1 if a blue-collar worker and =0 if a white- 
collar worker. 
Dependent Variables
CD = Total cost of displacement (equation 1).
CWW = Change in nominal weekly wages.
WKS = Weeks unemployed. 
Subscripts
i = Individual.
s = Local labor market.
The coefficients on YRLO, YRWKD, Age, Sex and OCC are ex 
pected to be negative, and the coefficients on AE, IE, ED, and Race 
are expected to be positive. A priori, the sign on the coefficient for BEN 
is ambiguous. Strong empirical evidence exists to show that individuals 
who receive UI compensation extend their job search, reducing the pre 
sent value of the unemployment experience. However, the expectation 
is that this extended job search will allow individuals to find employ 
ment more suited to their skills and thus to increase their reemployment
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wage beyond what it would have been if the worker had been forced 
by economic necessity to take the first job that came along. UI benefits 
should therefore extend the weeks unemployed and increase the new 
wage. But it is unclear whether the reemployment wage, extended five 
years into the future, will be large enough to offset the losses from a 
prolonged spell of unemployment.
Findings
The mean costs of displacement, the change in nominal weekly wages, 
and weeks unemployed are shown in table 5.2 for all displaced manufac 
turing workers, and for comparison purposes, all displaced workers.
Table 5.2
Unemployment and Reemployment Statistics in January 1984
for Workers Displaced Between January 1979 and December 1982
All Industries and All Manufacturing
Mean change
Cost of in nominal Out of Weeks
displacement8 weekly wages" Employed0 Unemployed0 labor force0 unemployed"
$ (% gain or loss) % % % %
All workers
-16,543. 4.03 68 15 17 32 
(1.0%)
All manufacturing workers
-21,531. -12.01 67 16 17 37 
(-4.1%)
a. Universe includes all workers in labor force at time of survey, except self employed.
b. Universe includes only wage and salaried workers. Excludes self employed. Equal to current
nominal weekly wage minus previous nominal weekly wage.
c. Universe includes all workers.
d. Universe includes all workers in labor force at time of survey, except self employed.
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Displaced workers who found new jobs did so at an average increase 
of $4 per week in wages. During the same period, the average weekly 
wage for all workers in the U.S. increased by an average of $17.50 
per year, or $11.00 over a 7.5-month period, the average unemploy 
ment spell for displaced workers. Therefore, displaced workers sus 
tained a net loss of $7 per week when compared to earnings for all 
workers over a comparable time period.
Displaced manufacturing workers suffered larger financial losses and 
longer unemployment spells than the average displaced worker. The 
average displaced manufacturing worker lost $12 per week in wages 
when reemployed. This drop occurred during the same period in which 
the average nominal weekly manufacturing wage increased by approx 
imately $24.00 per annum (U.S. Department of Commerce 1985, p. 
417).
We now turn to the question of how displaced workers fare in grow 
ing versus declining labor markets. Table 5.3 compares the costs of 
displacement in declining and growing labor markets for two industries, 
machinery and transportation manufacturing, and for all manufactur 
ing. Machinery and transportation manufacturing were selected for disag- 
gregation because they are the only 2-digit SIC code industries in the 
survey with sufficient numbers of observations to yield meaningful 
results. The table shows that the costs of displacement are sensitive to 
local industry employment growth. For machinery manufacturing, 
workers displaced in growing areas experienced, on the average, a net 
loss of $1,173 in the five years following displacement, compared to 
a net loss of approximately $17,182 for workers displaced in declining 
labor markets. Displaced transportation workers and all manufactur 
ing workers also experienced greater financial losses in declining than 
in growing labor markets.
Table 5.3 also compares the average change in nominal wages, the 
current employment status, and the average length of the unemploy 
ment spell in growing and declining local labor markets. All indicators 
are sensitive to local labor market conditions. However, for all manufac 
turing, the drop in wages for reemployed displaced workers is nearly 
equivalent in both growing and declining SMSAs.
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Table 5.3
Comparison of the Unemployment and Reemployment Experience 
of Displaced Manufacturing Workers in Growing and Declining 






























































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Supplement on Displaced Workers,
January 1984.
NOTE: For 2-digit SIC industries, growing labor markets defined as SMSAs with net job gain of 1450 jobs
or more in that industry; declining labor markets as SMSAs with net job loss greater than 49 jobs. For all
manufacturing, growing labor markets defined as net manufacturing employment growth equal to or greater
than 9,500 employees and declining labor markets as SMSAs with net job loss greater than 49 manufacturing
jobs. Selected industries with weighted totals of 10,000 population in both growing and declining SMSAs.
a. Includes all displaced workers currently in the labor force. Excludes self-employed. Value as calculated
in equation (1).
b. Includes only currently working wage and salaried workers. Excludes self-employed. Equal to current weekly
wage minus previous weekly wage. A positive value indicates a gain in nominal wages.
c. Includes all displaced workers, as defined in text. Definitions for each category are as defined by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census in its Current Population Survey.
d. Includes all displaced workers currently in the labor force. Excludes self-employed.
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Impact of Local Labor Market Conditions 
and Worker Characteristics
The results of equation (2) are shown in table 5.4. The dependent 
variable in column I is the cost of displacement. (Again, a negative value 
indicates a loss.) The dependent variables in columns II and in are the 
change in nominal weekly wages and number of weeks unemployed, 
respectively.
Several findings are of interest. First, the reemployment success of 
displaced manufacturing workers is more sensitive to local growth in 
their industry of displacement (IE) than in total local employment (AE). 
One interpretation is that manufacturing workers do not move easily 
into new industries, and when they do so it is at a substantial loss in 
income. The results on the local industry growth coefficient can be in 
terpreted as, for every 1,000 industry jobs added to the local labor market 
in a year, the losses experienced by a displaced worker are reduced 
by $4209. The coefficient on total employment growth (AE) is both 
relatively small and statistically insignificant.
We expected that the inclusion of movers in their SMSA of current 
residence rather than area of displacement would bias the coefficients 
on local economic growth downwards because some of the most hard 
hit and discouraged workers displaced in declining areas moved to 
growth economies. Reestimating equation (2) without movers, we found 
that the direction of the bias was as expected, but not large. Without 
movers in the equation, the coefficient on total employment (AE) is 
$19 and on local industry growth (IE) is equal to $4226.
While there is no evidence that growth in total local employment 
reduces the loss in weekly wages, there is evidence that workers displac 
ed in expanding local economies are unemployed for shorter periods 
of tune than workers in weak economies (see column HI). However, 
the impact is small. The coefficient on AE in column in can be inter 
preted to mean that a net increase of 1000 local jobs in all sectors reduces 
the unemployment spell by 2 percent of a week (or less than one hour). 
In contrast, an additional 1000 jobs in the workers' industry of displace 
ment reduces the unemployment spell by 2-1/2 weeks. The large financial
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losses of workers displaced where their industry is declining is due to 
both declines in weekly wages and lengthier periods of unemployment 
(columns n and HI).
Table 5.4
The Impact of Labor Market Conditions and Worker Demographics 





































































































* Statistically significant at 5 percent level of confidence.
** Statistically significant at 10 percent level of confidence. 
( ) t-statistics.
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As expected, workers laid off when the national economy was in 
decline experienced larger financial losses, due to greater declines in 
their reemployment wage. Contrary to expectation, however, workers 
displaced during the recessions experienced shorter periods of unemploy 
ment by nearly 10 weeks. One explanation is that workers displaced 
when the national economy is weak lower their reservation wage sooner 
and, therefore, find jobs more quickly than workers displaced in a 
stronger national economy.
Workers who had committed more years to their employer prior to 
layoff (YRWKD) experienced larger financial losses than recently 
employed workers. This finding indicates that earnings of senior workers 
reflected union rates or firm-specific skills of less value to new than 
prior employers. The results show that for every year of employment 
at their prelayoff job, workers lost $1285 in total income and $6.47 
in weekly wages once reemployed. When YRWKD is added to the equa 
tion, the coefficient on Age becomes insignificant. The two variables 
are highly correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of .56 (see 
appendix 5.2).
Surprisingly, the coefficient on education is insignificant. Again, this 
may be due to multicollinearity among the independent variables. Oc 
cupation and education are correlated (the correlation coefficient=.40) 
and when occupation is dropped, education is statistically significant.
In contrast to the numerous case study findings, this analysis shows 
women do better than men in recouping their prelayoff wage (but do 
not experience shorter unemployment spells). There are two possible 
explanations. First, women probably earned lower wages in the manufac 
turing sector than men, and therefore had less difficulty recovering their 
prelayoff wage. Second, women are likely to hold service sector-type 
jobs in manufacturing, and thus may be able to put those skills to use 
in another industry, including the growing service sector. Men, on the 
other hand, may have been trained for jobs specific to their industry 
or firm. When a similar job is not available in another firm, they may 
have to again start at the bottom of the wage ladder. Our findings on 
the reemployment pattern for women may differ from earlier studies 
because previous studies explained wage levels rather than wage changes.
Displaced Workers 133
In support of case study and other statistical studies, nonwhites ap 
pear to experience larger financial losses than whites, by $14,135. These 
losses are due to blacks' longer unemployment spells, by nearly 18 
weeks, and not to larger losses in the reemployment wage of blacks.
The generosity of state unemployment insurance (UI) payments has 
no impact on the cost of displacement, the reemployment wage, or the 
weeks unemployed. One explanation for this finding is that displaced 
workers behave differently from all unemployed, and do not prolong 
their job search where UI benefits are larger. A second possibility is 
that average weekly UI benefits may be a poor measure of a worker's 
actual compensation. Displaced workers, in addition to UI benefits, may 
receive Trade Adjustment Assistance, extended health care benefits, 
severance payments from the company, or compensation from their 
union. Unfortunately, the BLS survey did not ask respondents about 
supplemental compensation.
Finally, there is evidence that blue-collar workers are unemployed 
for an average of 15.8 weeks longer than white-collar workers, but lit 
tle support for the hypothesis that blue-collar workers are less likely 
than white-collar workers to recoup their prelayoff wage. To summarize, 
we find the reemployment success of displaced workers is more sen 
sitive to local employment growth in their industry of displacement than 
to growth in all industries, and that black, blue-collar workers with long 
commitments to their prelayoff employer experience the largest finan 
cial losses.
Impact of Prenotification on the Reemployment 
Success of Displaced Workers
The CPS data base also provides information on whether displaced 
workers were notified by employers their plant would close. Among 
the numerous federal proposals to deal with worker displacement, 
employee prenotification of an impending closing has the most support 
from both labor and Congress. In 1985, proponents of a national plant 
closing bill put their strength behind legislation requiring only prenotifica 
tion, ignoring a host of other issues such as severance payments, ex 
tended health care, mandatory negotiation over whether the closing can
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be averted, and employee retraining. This legislation was narrowly 
defeated in a House vote on November 21, 1985,203 to 208. A similar 
bill, requiring 60 days notice for firms with 100 employees or more, 
was revived in the 100th Congress. The bill was passed by both Houses, 
but vetoed by President Reagan in mid-1988. The House of Represen 
tatives overrode the presidential veto. A majority in the Senate sup 
ported passage, but they could not muster a two-thirds vote. The legisla 
tion was a omnibus bill, including a wide range of trade related initiatives. 
However, the mandatory prenotification clause attracted the most con 
troversy and was responsible for the veto of the total trade package.
Maine and Wisconsin currently require advance notice, although the 
legislation is only weakly enforced; and during the period 1975-83, 30 
states introduced more than 125 bills relating to plant closings. More 
than 90 percent of these bills had provisions requiring advance notice 
of shutdowns (Ehrenberg 1985).
The legislative emphasis on prenotification is motivated by the belief 
that adjustment problems are particularly acute where workers and com 
munities receive little advance notice of a closing, and consequently 
cannot plan for an employee buyout, reuse of the physical facility, or 
a period of personal or community fiscal stringency. Advance notice 
also gives employers, workers and the community a chance to explore 
ways to keep the plant operating through, for example, the identifica 
tion of a new owner. Finally, prenotification gives local governments 
a chance to set up retraining and counseling programs for displaced 
workers. It is difficult to reach displaced workers once the plant has 
closed and the workers have dispersed.
Opponents of federal- or state-mandated prenotification claim such 
legislation would have adverse effects on the firm and the community. 
Potential adverse effects on the firm include the departure of the firm's 
most productive workers prior to the closing, falling stock prices for 
the plant's parent, and precedent for further government involvement 
in the affairs of business. Opponents also claim that mandatory 
prenotification would inhibit local economic growth by discouraging 
firms from locating or expanding in states where an advance notice law 
is in effect (McKenzie 1982).
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The evidence on the frequency of employee prenotification indicates 
that, in the absence of legislation, little or no prenotification is com 
mon. The following story by a displaced worker from a branch of 
Dresser Industries is typical of the anecdotal evidence.
When Dresser got us down to about 50 people, they told us 
we were in trouble. They said we'd have to give up 
something. It wasn't contract time until June of '84 and we 
had no reopener clause, so those of us that were left gave 
the company a full week without pay.
We were worried and scared, too, I guess.
We asked management if the plant was going to close. At 
first, we were told no, and later were told, if the plant was 
going to shut down, we would be given plenty of advance 
notice.
But that isn't the way it worked. In October we were told 
the plant was going to be shut down within three weeks. And 
on November 15, 1982 it shut down and closed. 3
In 1980, only about 13 percent of all major collective bargaining con 
tracts included prenotification clauses. About one-half of those did not 
specify the length of advance notice and only 34 percent agreed to an 
advance notice of 31 days or more (Wendling 1984). Although these 
figures indicate that a minority of employers are required to give ad 
vance warning of a closing, the figures may actually overstate the number 
of protected workers. Employees not covered by a collective bargain 
ing agreement are even less likely to have a legal right to advance notice.
A second study on the frequency of prenotification indicates higher 
rates of prenotification. Gainer (1986) surveyed 355 firms that closed 
plants and found that 20 percent of the establishments had provided their 
workers with over 90 days of advance notice and 40 percent had pro 
vided less than 14 days or no advance notice. The higher prenotifica- 
tion figures in the Gainer study could be because (1) many firms who 
are not required to give prenotification do so; (2) the Gainer study is 
more recent and, with increased publicity, more firms are giving 
prenotification; or (3) Gainer interviewed larger firms (firms with 100 
employees or more), which are more likely than the average size firm 
to give advance notice.
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One study of the impact of prenotification on reemployment success 
is by Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984). They used data from 
Maine, prior to the passage of the 1982 mandatory advance notice law, 
and found that unemployment rates in local communities where a clos 
ing occurred did not rise as high and fell faster where employees had 
been given advance notice of the closing. The authors argue that this 
evidence "strongly suggests that Maine workers significantly benefit- 
ted from advance notification of job loss" (p. 195).
Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981), using a sample of 9500 workers from 
42 plants that closed, found a statistically significant and positive rela 
tionship between advance notice and postdisplacement losses. In other 
words, workers given advance notice experienced greater postdisplace 
ment losses than those who were not given advance warning. The authors 
speculated that "advance notice may be given in just those cases where 
losses are expected to be high" (p. 27). Although the authors suggest 
the variable prenotification may be endogenously determined, they do 
not make the appropriate corrections in their empirical work.
The BLS's Survey of Displaced Workers permits the exploration 
of several of the issues posed above, including whether a displaced 
worker was prenotified, the extent to which prenotification encourages 
preclosing departures, and the impact of prenotification on workers' 
reemployment success.
The question posed to workers was, "Did you expect a layoff or had 
you received advance notice of a layoff or a plant or business closing?" 
The survey includes no additional information as to the length of the 
advance notice, or whether the worker was informed by management 
or expected the plant to close because of such factors as rumors of poor 
profit performance. Even given these shortcomings, there are several 
interesting findings.
Among all displaced manufacturing workers living in SMSAs at the 
time of the survey, 61 percent said they were either given advance notice 
or expected their plant to close. Among the 61 percent who expected 
a closing, only 9 percent left their jobs before they would have been 
laid off. 4
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The impact of prenotification on displacement losses was tested us 
ing both the ordinary least squares estimation of equation (3) below and 
two-stage least squares (2SLS):
(3) CD=a0 +a 1AEs +a2IEs +a3YRLOi +a4YRWKDi
tj-l-a9BENs
Where the variables are defined in table 5.1, except: 
PN=Dummy variable, with 1 =the worker was prenotified or expected 
the closing and 0=the worker was caught by surprise.
Column I in table 5.5 reports the results, which indicate larger losses 
for prenotified than non-notified workers. This result is similar to that 
of Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) who used both a different data set 
and different measures of income losses. One explanation for this 
counterintuitive result is that, for humanitarian reasons, employers are 
more likely to prenotify workers who will experience large losses. 
Another reason is that employers may be more likely to prenotify workers 
in weak labor markets, where losses will be large, because employees 
will have relatively few employment options. Employers may know the 
probability is small that these workers will leave prior to the closing.
If any of the above explanations are true, there will be simultaneity 
bias in the estimated coefficients. If prenotification is a function of ex 
pected financial losses, the assumption of independence between the 
independent variables and the error term is violated (see Maddala 1977, 
pp. 231-235).
The 2SLS method of estimating simultaneous equations was used to 
correct for this problem. The simultaneous equation system includes 
equations (3) and (4), where equation (4) explains the probability a 
worker was prenotified about the closing. A predicted value of
XN
prenotification (PN) was generated using the reduced form of equation 
(4). The variable PN in equation (3) was then replaced with PN .
(4) PN=7o+7iCONj + T2UNj + T3MEs + 74Sj + 75CDi
where
CON=Percent of output produced by the four largest firms in 
1980.
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UN=Dummy variable =1 if the SMSA and industry had above 
median levels of unionization and 0 if they did not.
ME=Annual average change in manufacturing employment, 1979 
to 1982.
S=Average size of plant in 1980.
CD=Costs of displacement.




The above independent variables were included because it was ex 
pected workers in concentrated industries would be more likely to 
negotiate advance warning clauses in labor contracts; unionized workers 
would be more likely to be prenotified for the same reason; workers 
in growing economies would be less likely to be prenotified because 
employers feared they would leave early; and workers in large plants 
were more likely to suspect or hear rumors about an impending closure. 
The reduced form of equation (4) was estimated with a logit model, 
since the dependent variable is dichotomous. PN, the probability a 
worker was prenotified is, however, a continuous variable.
The results of the 2SLS estimation are reported in columns II, III, 
and IV of table 5.5. While the results show the expected sign on PN, 
the coefficient is still not significant. There is no evidence prenotified 
workers experience smaller financial losses than non-notified workers.
One hypothesis is that prenotification only reduces financial losses 
when workers are located in growing labor markets. This hypothesis 
was tested by including interaction terms between prenotification and 
local employment growth. Again, neither interaction term is signifi 
cant, reinforcing evidence that prenotification does not reduce losses 
to displaced workers (see table 5.6).
The only workers who appear to benefit from advance notice are those 
who quit prior to layoff (see table 5.7). Table 5.7 reports the results 
when only prenotified workers are included in the analysis and the dum 
my variable PN is replaced with a dummy on prenotification and early 
quit (PN&QT). The variable PN&QT is equal to 1 when a prenotified
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Table 5.5
Impact of Prenotification on the Reemployment Success 
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worker left prior to the closing and 0 when a prenotified worker stayed. 
As expected, workers who are prenotified and early quitters experience 
smaller displacement losses by $27,311, smaller weekly wage losses 
by $123, and shorter unemployment periods by .21 weeks (or one day). 
These preclosing leavers are probably among the most reemployable 
of the prenotified workers, and advance warning of the closing appears 
to give many of them an opportunity to leave early. Since 9 percent 
of displaced workers quit early after prenotification, compared to a quit 
rate of 1.6 percent over the same period for all manufacturing, it ap 
pears that many of the early quits are, in fact, a response to advance 
notification (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981 and 1982). For workers 
displaced in tight labor markets, an early departure from a job may also 
decrease the competition for available jobs and improve workers' 
reemployment chances.
Summary
We began this chapter by addressing three questions. (1) What im 
pact does local labor market growth have on the readjustment of displaced 
manufacturing workers? (2) Are there specific demographic groups who 
experience large financial losses after displacement even when laid off 
in growing labor markets? (3) What impact does worker prenotifica 
tion have on the reemployment success of displaced manufacturing 
workers?
The first two questions can be addressed using the coefficients reported 
in column I, table 5.4 and several profiles of displaced workers. We 
select a 50-year-old, white, male, blue-collar worker, displaced in 1979 
or 1981, with a 12th grade education, who worked at that firm 25 years 
prior to layoff, who is receiving the average UI compensation of $90.55 
per week and is located in a labor market that lost an annual average 
of 3,000 jobs in all sectors and 500 industry jobs. This worker would 
experience an estimated financial loss of $52,000 in the five years im 
mediately following layoff. The same individual in a labor market with 
an expansion of 3,000 jobs in all sectors and 500 industry jobs would 
have been only approximately $4,400 better off.
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Younger, blue-collar workers also experience financial losses in both 
growing and declining labor markets. For example, a 25-year-old, male, 
blue-collar worker, with three years committed to the firm prior to layoff 
but with the same remaining characteristics as the individual in the declin 
ing economy described above, would have lost approximately $16,000 
as a result of displacement.
The losses for an older, white-collar male worker within the declin 
ing economy and with the same characteristics described in case one 
above would be approximately $42,000. However, the losses for young, 
male, white-collar workers are small and may well be compensated for 
by unemployment insurance and other benefits. For example, the losses 
for the young, white-collar worker (25 years old, three years commit 
ted to the job prior to layoff, with a 12th grade education) in the declining 
labor market defined above, would have been an estimated $6,200.
The only women who appear to experience large losses are the older, 
blue- and white-collar workers who committed many years to their 
employer prior to layoff. These women appear to experience large losses 
in both growing and declining labor markets. Young blue- and white- 
collar women with at least a high school diploma appear to make the 
transition to reemployment with little financial loss.
It should be recognized that the above losses and gains are rough 
estimates. First, the estimates of displacement costs do not account for 
wage increases once a worker is reemployed, nor do they account for 
any wage increases or reductions workers would have experienced had 
they remained on their prelayoff job. Second, the losses are 
underestimated because they exclude losses in fringe benefits. Third, 
the losses may be overestimated because they do not include unemploy 
ment benefits or severance payments. The value of UI benefits varies 
by state and the calculation of likely payments per worker is beyond 
the scope of this study. However, a rough low estimate of the average 
benefits paid would range between $2,272 and $3,024. 5 These benefits 
would cancel the losses experienced by some, but not all, displaced 
workers.
It should be noted that the model predicts only 22 percent of the varia 
tion in the dependent variable. This result is, however, similar to the 
results from other studies that predict the behavior of individuals. 6 Final-
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ly, it should be remembered that the population studied here is com 
prised of workers displaced in large, relatively diversified local 
economies. The personal financial losses attributable to displacement 
may be much larger in small towns and rural labor markets where there 
are fewer employment opportunities.
In summary, our findings indicate that while labor market conditions 
influence a displaced worker's reemployment experience, the effects 
of local labor market conditions are not sufficiently strong to overshadow 
the impact of years worked prior to layoff and age, occupation, race 
and sex. As a consequence, most blue-collar workers and mature white- 
collar workers experience substantial financial losses after displacement, 
even when displaced in an expanding local economy.
Finally, we did not find evidence that prenotification of layoff reduces 
financial losses. This result may be due, in part, to the fact that only 
about 9 percent of the workers in our sample who were prenotified left 
their jobs prior to the plant's closure. While there is no evidence that 
prenotification alone improves the displaced workers' income stream, 
this should not be interpeted as an argument against advance notice 
legislation. Prenotifiation gives workers a chance to adjust expenditures 
in the face of upcoming losses in income, communities a chance to 
establish job training and counseling programs to assist displaced 
workers, and communities and workers a chance to seek alternatives 
to the plant closing.
NOTES
1. Jacobson and Thomason (1979) and Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) tracked the difference be 
tween the trajectory of prelayoff wages and reemployment wages and found that the gap did in 
fact narrow over time. In contrast, Ruhm (1987) examined the persistence of wage losses for 
involuntarily laid-off workers and found 42 percent did not experience any narrowing of the loss 
after five years.
2. In all calculations where the present value of the unemployment experience is used, the sample 
universe excludes the self-employed and workers who have dropped out of the labor force. The 
self-employed are excluded because wages are not collected for this group. Workers who have 
dropped out of the labor force are excluded because we cannot value their current wage at zero, 
as we do with the involuntarily unemployed. These are individuals who may put a value on leisure 
or other nonpaid productive work that exceeds the value of paid work in the labor force. This 
group is most likely to include workers near retirement age; women, especially those with young
Displaced Workers 145
children; and young workers who are returning to school. This group also includes discouraged 
workers, who probably experience the largest financial losses from displacement. The costs of 
displacement for those on the work-no work margin are probably low, whereas the costs of displace 
ment for the discouraged worker are high. To the extent these two groups offset each other, there 
should be no bias in CD as a result of the exclusion of workers who have dropped out of the 
labor force.
3. Testimony by James Savoy, President Local Lodge 2689 International Association of Machinists, 
before the U.S. Congress (1983).
4. The BLS does not report a quit rate for non-notified workers.
5. The average manufacturing worker was unemployed longer than 26 weeks, the maximum period 
for receiving UI benefits under the state UI system. The average weekly benefits paid in all in 
dustries was $89.68 in 1979 and $119.34 in 1982 (U.S. Department of Labor 1983, p. 208). 
The above value is equal to the present value of 26 weeks of benefits at these levels. This is estimated 
to be a lower bound on UI benefits because many displaced manufacturing workers are eligible 
for extended benefits and because manufacturing wages are higher than the all-industry average. 
Consequently, the average weekly benefits paid to manufacturing workers is probably higher than 
the above estimate.
6. For example, in a regression equation with similar independent variables plus home owner 
ship, Bendick and Devine (1981) reported an R2 of .02. Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981) found 
demographic characteristics of displaced workers explained only 20 percent of the variation in 
wage losses one year after displacement. Clearly, variables other than the ones included here 
influence the personal financial costs associated with displacement. Possible missing variables 
are personal attributes of the workers.
146 Displaced Workers
Appendix 5.1 
Data Sources for the Labor Market Variables
Total Employment Growth, March 1979 to March 1982 data: U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, June 1980 and May 1983.
Industry Employment at 2-Digit SIC Code Level, 1977 to 1981 data: U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to Employment and Earnings, States 
and Areas, Data for 1977-81, Bulletin 1370-16, September 1982. 1980-1983 data: U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to Employment, Hours 
and Earnings, States and Areas, Data for 1980-84, Bulletin 1370-19, September 1985.
Manufacturing Employment, 1979 to 1982 data: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, table B-8, March 1980 and table B-8, 
February 1984.
Mean Unemployment Rate, 1979 to 1982: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Employment and Earnings, June 1980 and May 1983.
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This study of regional plant closure patterns in three manufacturing 
industries and of the costs of displacement in all manufacturing was 
designed to identify (1) where plant closures are most likely to occur, 
(2) the causes of plant closures, and (3) the conditions under which plant 
closure and worker displacement lead to large financial losses for the 
displaced worker. Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings and their 
immediate policy implications and reviews several directions for fur 
ther research.
Data on the three manufacturing industries were extracted from the 
Dun and Bradstreet Dun's Market Identifiers file for the years 1973, 
1975, 1979, and 1982. The three industries include metal working 
machinery (SIC 354), electronic components (SIC 367), and motor 
vehicles (SIC 371). In total, there were approximately 54,000 
establishments in the data set, representing a 100 percent sample of total 
employment in the three industries as measured by the Census of 
Manufactures. One strength of these data is that employment growth 
can be disaggregated into components of employment change, including 
employment growth due to plant start-ups, closings, net expansions or 
contractions, and plant migrations.
Plant Closures and Regional Economic Growth
Three sets of findings are drawn from the analysis of the D&B data. 
First, there is little regional variation in rates of plant closure. The range 
(difference between the highest and lowest rate) is 2.3 percentage points 
in metal working machinery, 2.9 percentage points in electronic com-
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ponents, and 2.8 percentage points in motor vehicles. Moreover, there 
is no correlation between cross-regional rates of industry growth and 
regional rates of plant closures.
In contrast, the regional variation in rates of employment gains due 
to start-ups can be large and is highly correlated with cross-regional 
differences in industry growth rates. In metal working machinery, growth 
rates vary from -1.9 percent in the Mid-Atlantic to 9.5 percent in the 
Mountain states, while start-ups range between 1.6 percent to 10.3 per 
cent. In electronic components, growth rates vary from -2.6 percent 
in the Mid-Atlantic region to 17.7 percent in the East South Central, 
and start-ups in these same regions vary from 2.4 percent to 17.5 per 
cent. Only in motor vehicles is the correlation between employment 
change and start-ups weak, but this is primarily because there is very 
little cross-regional variation in either of these statistics. Growth varies 
from -2.9 percent in the Pacific to 1.3 percent in the East South Cen 
tral, while start-ups vary from .5 to .3 percent in these regions.
It is clear that regions with slow growth have low start-up rates and 
limited expansions. They do not have particularly high rates of plant 
closures. Conversely, fast growth is due primarily to high start-up rates, 
rather than to low rates of job loss due to closures.
These results are consistent with the findings of Birch (1979) of MIT 
and Armington and Odle (1982) of Brookings, who reported similar 
findings for manufacturing as a whole and other major economic sectors.
Second, we further tested the relationship between regional economic 
growth and rates of plant closures in a model estimating the probability 
of a closure during the period 1975 to 1982. The independent variables 
included establishment size, age, status as a branch, subsidiary, head 
quarters, or independent operation, and regional and interregional loca 
tion. Few of the locational dummies were statistically significant, and 
when they were significant they indicated the probability of closure was 
higher for establishments located in fast-growing southern regions than 
for those in the slow-growing or declining northern regions.
Third, we tested the view that relatively high production costs are 
responsible for many plant closings by examining the effect on plant 
closings of several local economic factors—the level and rate of change 
of wages and utility rates, the level of taxes, the extent of unionization,
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the degree of import competition, and changes in product demand. We 
also examined the effect of plant size and status as a branch, subsidiary, 
headquarters, or independent. Because the data on local economic con 
ditions are only available by Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(SMSAs), our sample was limited to plants in SMSAs.
We found status as a branch plant or subsidiary influences closures 
in all three industries. A branch plant is 32 percent, 25 percent, and 
16 percent more likely to close than is an independent in the metal work 
ing, electronic components, and motor vehicle industries, respective 
ly. Comparable statistics for subsidiaries versus independents in the same 
three industries are 17 percent, 8 percent, and 11 percent. On the other 
hand, independents and headquarters are equally likely to close.
When the economic variables are included in the equation, establish 
ment size has a significant effect on closures in metalworking machinery 
and motor vehicles, with larger plants closing at lower rates. But in 
19 of the 21 tests, economic variables were shown to have no signifi 
cant effect on plant closures. In two cases, there was a significant ef 
fect but in the "wrong" direction. In the metalworking industry, low 
wages and increases in local product demand were associated with an 
increased probability of closure.
These conclusions contradict the results of some survey-based studies 
that interviewed managers responsible for plant closures. For exam 
ple, in Gainer's (1986) survey of 355 firms that closed a plant, 57 per 
cent cited the high cost of labor as a major factor in their decision. 
Schmenner (1982) discovered that 21 percent of managers attributed 
their plant shutdowns to high labor costs and 10 percent cited labor 
unions.
Two explanations for the inconsistency between our statistical results 
and the findings of surveys are possible. One is that managers attempt 
to exert downward pressure on wages in general, and in their other con 
tinuing plants, by overstating the role that wage rates played in a closure. 
The closure of a plant may be used as an opportunity to intimidate labor 
and encourage workers to rein in their future wage demands. Another 
possible explanation is that wages are a large portion of a firm's costs 
and are especially noticeable when the plant falls on hard economic times. 
High labor costs, rather than more subtle reasons for closure, such as
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the company's failure or inability to adopt labor-saving technologies, 
find new markets, improve worker productivity, improve the quality 
of the product in the face of competition, etc., may be blamed for the 
closure.
The impact of unionization as a cause of plant closures also appears 
to be exaggerated. Scholars from all political perspectives, as well as 
business spokespersons, frequently attribute plant closures to justified 
or unjustified demands by unions (see, for example, Bluestone and Har- 
rison 1982). High wages, relatively generous fringe benefits, costly 
strikes, and health and safety restrictions can all accompany a unioniz 
ed labor force and supposedly reduce a plant's competitiveness. While 
there is evidence that the small number of metalworking machinery plants 
which do relocate tend to move out of unionized regions, there is no 
indication that plants situated in a unionized labor market are more likely 
to close than plants located in a nonunion area.
There are two theories for the relatively high closure rates of branch 
es and subsidiaries. One theory argues that managers of multidivisional 
firms and subsidiaries expect branches to yield higher rates of return 
than is the case for single-plant entrepreneurs. This hypothesis is plausible 
because multiplant firms have good information about which branches 
and divisions are most profitable. Consequently, they can and do allocate 
cash flow to the highest yield activities and phase out, divest themselves 
of, and close the least profitable operations. In addition, multiplant firms 
also have the expertise and staff to search outside the current product 
line and locations for more profitable sites and ventures, again phasing 
out less profitable activities.
In contrast, entrepreneurs operating single-plant firms have fewer in 
vestment alternatives. They will be more likely, therefore, to keep a 
plant operating when its profits fall below the rate at which a multiplant 
firm would close down the operation. Nonpecuniary factors may also 
play an important role. The small scale entrepreneur may enjoy runn 
ing the company and is likely to live in, derive status from, and have 
a commitment to the community where the business is located.
The second view also argues that plants are closed when profits are 
inadequate, but in this model multiplant firms are responsible for the 
low profitability of their branches and subsidiaries. One explanation
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of why profits are low in the long run is that corporations expend 
resources on short-run paper profits, rather than on making the in 
vestments needed to develop new products, find new markets, and im 
prove production technologies. A second is that corporations frequent 
ly acquire activities in which they have little operating experience. As 
a result, a once profitable acquisition may be poorly managed, become 
unprofitable, and ultimately be closed.
Policy Implications for Local Economic Development
Regardless of which explanation best fits a particular branch or sub 
sidiary closing, the above results suggest that local takeovers of "un 
profitable" branches and subsidiaries can be an option for keeping plants 
operating and jobs in the community. This is a viable strategy because 
(1) closures do not appear to be the inevitable consequence of local 
economic conditions, and (2) local new owners may either be willing 
to accept lower rates of return in exchange for community and job stabili 
ty or be able to improve upon the previous management to establish 
a satisfactory rate of return.
While there is little literature on local private takeovers of closing 
plants, there is a burgeoning interest in employee takeovers. Evidence 
on the profitability of existing employee-owned firms is encouraging. 
A number of studies have compared profitability in employee-owned 
firms and producer cooperatives with profits in privately-owned firms 
in the same industry. Conte (1982) surveyed a number of these studies, 
identifying their shortcomings. A number of difficulties in comparing 
profitability in privately- and employee-owned firms arise. For exam 
ple, profits in an employee-owned firm may be paid in wages and thus 
not show up on the balance sheet as profits. Another difficulty with 
such comparisons is that many successful employee-owned firms are 
eventually taken over by private companies. As an employee-owned 
firm's profits and stock values increase, currently employed workers 
often cannot afford to purchase the stock of retiring employees. Rather 
than sell stock at below-market prices, employees sell to private interests. 
In other cases, successful employee-owned firms have gone public to 
acquire expansion capital.
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Taking these difficulties into account, Conte concludes that the average 
employee-owned firm is as profitable, if not more so, than the average 
privately-owned firm in the same industry. Although experience with 
employee-owned firms is still limited, several case studies indicate that 
both improved efficiency and wage concessions, combined with new 
management, are responsible for the successes (Bradley and Gelb 1985; 
Whyte 1986; Washington Post 1985).
Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986, p. 27) of the National Center for 
Employee Ownership estimate there have been 65 buyouts since 1971. 
About 90 percent are still in business. Out of the 65 buyouts, 2 are com 
ing out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, 4 have been profitably 
sold to conventional businesses, and 5 have closed.
There are a number of policies the federal government can adopt to 
facilitate local takeovers of closing establishments. One barrier to local 
ownership is a lack of capital. Local banks are the major source of capital 
for small business, and they are often reluctant to risk financing a 
business that has a poor track record and a reputation for failure. In 
the case of employee takeovers, many banks have also been reluctant 
to make loans to an ownership form with which they are unfamiliar. 
Moreover, if the closing operation is large, a local bank may not have 
the resources to make the loan and still keep a diversified portfolio. 
Federal loan guarantees of up to 80 percent of the value of a loan would 
reduce the risk to banks and encourage banks to make the loans, leav 
ing the banks with enough at stake to carefully evaluate the business' 
viability. In a number of instances, federal loan guarantees have already 
been critical factors in employee buyouts.
A second federal initiative that would facilitate local takeovers is man 
datory prenotification of a closing. In order for workers and communities 
to plan a buyout, they must have advance warning that the business 
is closing. The chances for a successful takeover are much greater when 
new owners can purchase an operating business. Once managers have 
departed and ties with suppliers and markets have been severed, return 
ing a company to profitability is difficult. In order to purchase opera 
tions with markets and employees intact, local buyers must have time 
to conduct feasibility studies and negotiate financing. While the length 
of time necessary for planning a local takeover varies by the size of
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plant, case studies of worker buyouts of larger plants suggest that at 
least 180 days are needed to negotiate and assemble financing (Stern, 
Wood, and Hammer 1979; Whyte 1986; Logue, Quilligan, and 
Weissmann 1986).
Federal initiative in this area is critical. States are reluctant to take 
the lead in requiring prenotiflcation for fear of discouraging new in 
vestment. With federal prenotification legislation as an umbrella, ex 
isting state programs could improve their success rates.
The above findings also suggest state and local governments should 
look critically at claims by the private sector that high taxes are driving 
plants out of business or that tax concessions will put a plant operating 
in the red into the black. We found no evidence that plant closures were 
more frequent events in high-tax than low-tax areas. In fact, tax cuts 
may adversely affect local development if the quality of the local in 
frastructure and schools is diminished as a consequence. Similarly, utility 
companies should avoid pricing policies that shift costs from manufac 
turers to consumers as a job retention strategy, and employees should 
be skeptical of wage concessions as a means of saving jobs. Where firms 
demand such concessions, it is likely that companies are taking advan 
tage of a strong bargaining position due to the need for local jobs to 
wrest tax, utility rate and wage concessions from government, utility 
companies and employees. While surely wage, utility rate, and tax reduc 
tions will improve the profit performance of a particular plant, there 
is no evidence that such policies alone will reduce local rates of plant 
closures.
This conclusion on wage concessions is supported by other empirical 
evidence. In a study of the tire industry, Cappelli (1985) found that 
"virtually every one of the plants in which concessions were negotiated 
in recent years eventually closed." The same author also argues that 
firms are threatening shutdowns and engaging in concession bargain 
ing when there is no danger of closing. For example, a poll of 619 large, 
unionized employers found that 11 percent of the firms surveyed were 
taking advantage of the fear of plant closures to demand employee con 
cessions, even though the company did not need them to survive. In 
1984, the Wall Street Journal also reported that a number of pro-
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fitable firms have used the threat of outsourcing and shutdowns to force 
concessions from unions (Cappelli 1985, p. 101).
Two caveats should be added to these conclusions. First, our results 
and policy conclusions only hold for the range of wages, taxes, utility 
costs, etc., currently found across SMSAs. If a locality, for example, 
were to raise tax rates substantially above the range of values tested 
in this study, closure rates could rise. Second, although we found no 
evidence that high wages, utility costs, and rates of unionization en 
couraged plant closures, these conditions have been found to discourage 
new investments in the form of plant start-ups and expansion. Conse 
quently, the above policy conclusions should not be interpreted as a 
suggestion that wages and other costs can be raised without adverse 
impact on local economic growth.
Cross-Industry Variations in Plant Closures
Whereas plant closure rates do not vary much across the regions, 
neither do they appear to vary substantially across industries. To the 
extent they do vary at all, they are positively associated with industry 
employment growth. The 1973-79 rate of job loss due to closures was 
-3.0 in metal working machinery, while the overall rate of national 
growth was .2, according to the D&B data. In electronic components, 
which grew at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent, the rates of job 
loss due to plant closures was -3.9 percent. The comparable figures 
for motor vehicles were -2.3 for closure and -2.4 for growth.
The result is similar for the 4-digit industries within these three 3-digit 
industries. There was little variation in plant closure rates across in 
dustries, after plant size and status are held constant.
We also explored the impact of imports on job loss due to plant closures 
and found no evidence that plant closure rates are higher in industries 
facing strong import competition. While clearly these conclusions are 
limited to metal working machinery, electronic components, and motor 
vehicles, these industries vary widely in their rates of growth and 
vulnerability to imports. For example, within motor vehicles (SIC 371), 
imports in motor vehicle bodies (SIC 3711) grew by 8 percent per year,
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while truck body imports (SIC 3713) did not grow at all. Yet plants 
in both industries were equally likely to close, after plant status and 
location were held constant. Similar statistics characterize metalwork- 
ing machinery and electronic components. Our findings are consistent 
with unpublished data from the Brookings Institution's Small Business 
Microdata Project. Brookings used the total D&B file and found that 
cross-industry variations in manufacturing start-ups and expansions, 
rather than cross-industry variations in closures, were responsible for 
variations in industry rates of growth at the 2-digit level of industrial 
detail.
Industrial Policy as a Strategy 
to Assist Displaced Workers
The findings raise several questions about proposals to assist displaced 
workers in declining industries. Import restrictions and government sub 
sidies to declining industries are two proposed strategies in the ongo 
ing debate on industrial policy and plant closing legislation. l The in 
tention of industrial protection is to slow exits from the industry and 
give firms time to diversify product lines or update their capital stock. 
The responsiveness of start-ups to market growth suggests that govern 
ment policies to protect an industry and increase market demand may 
encourage new plant openings in the industry rather than reduce the 
rate at which existing establishments are phased out. This will not aid 
displaced workers unless the new jobs are created in the same labor 
market where the plant closings occur. Given the current shift of new 
investment to the Sun Belt, this outcome is unlikely. The textile industry 
is an example where years of import protection helped textile companies, 
but did not preserve jobs for New England's textile workers.
It should be noted, however, that these conclusions and policy im 
plications are limited to workers displaced by plant closures and do not 
extend to permanent layoffs in continuing plants. Permanent layoffs in 
on-going establishments may be greater in import-affected and declin 
ing industries, a question not explored in this study.
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Financial Costs of Worker Displacement
As stated above, plant closures occur at almost even rates across the 
nation's regions. The issue of whether worker displacement is or is not 
a national issue depends on (1) whether all displaced workers, even those 
laid off in growing markets, experience large financial losses, or 
(2) whether the losses in wages and long unemployment spells are prob 
lems specific to dislocated workers in declining labor markets.
We used the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Population Survey— 
Supplement on Displaced Workers to examine financial costs of worker 
displacement. The survey identified workers who had been involun 
tarily displaced from their jobs between January 1979 and January 1984. 
Analysis of these data shows that workers displaced in local markets 
with a growing demand for labor experience shorter unemployment spells 
and smaller wage losses than workers laid off in weak labor markets. 
However, most displaced workers, even those displaced in strong labor 
markets, experience some financial loss in the five years after layoff. 
For example, we found the average metalworking machinery worker 
in a declining labor market experienced $17,182 in financial losses in 
the five years after displacement. The average metalworking machinery 
worker displaced in a growing labor market experienced an average 
of $1,173 in financial losses. The equivalent figures for workers displac 
ed from transportation manufacturing are $45,942 in declining and 
$6,130 in growing labor markets, and for all manufacturing workers 
the estimted losses are $31,298 for workers displaced in declining labor 
markets and $19,759 for workers displaced in growing areas.
As anticipated, older and less-educated workers are hardest hit by 
the permanent loss of their jobs, a finding consistent with numerous 
other studies. Contrary to others, however, we found that women ex 
perience smaller financial losses after dislocation than men. The losses 
to a displaced woman, in the five years after layoff, were an estimated 
$19,000 lower than losses experienced by a man of the same age, educa 
tional attainment, race, and labor market. The difference in the male 
and female postlayoff experience is explained by the tendency for women 
to come closer to recouping their prelayoff wage, rather than by shorter 
periods of unemployment for women than men. The smaller losses for
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women may be explained either by women's lower prelayoff wage, 
which is easier than men's to duplicate, or the fact that women are more 
likely than men to hold clerical jobs in the manufacturing sector, and 
consequently to have skills valued in the growing service sector.
Policies to Assist Displaced Workers
Even with adequate legal provisions for employee prenotification and 
assistance for employee ownership, many establishments cannot be made 
profitable and jobs cannot be saved. The results presented above fur 
ther emphasize the findings of many other researchers, which argue 
for additional adjustment assistance to older workers, and for increas 
ed investment in education to ease labor adjustments to economic change.
Assistance for older displaced workers may include phased-in early 
social security payments, legislated early retirement benefits for older 
workers, or extended unemployment insurance benefits. Because job 
search skills for this group of workers are rusty at best, resume writing 
and job search workshops have been proposed, along with support groups 
or "job clubs" which offer displaced workers emotional support and 
companionship during the adjustment to a new job or early retirement.
Efforts to promote formal education should also reduce the costs of 
displacement. Programs to encourage young people to remain in school 
before entering the workforce, to attend continuing education programs, 
or to return to school after displacement, should also reduce the per 
sonal and societal costs of displacement. The effort here should be on 
reading, writing and analytical skills to complement the $30 to $50 
million annual expenditures made by private industries for education 
(Bendick 1983). Data from the displaced workers survey show that 10 
percent of displaced workers have attended elementary school only. 
Another 15 percent have attended high school but have not graduated. 
Efforts should be made to facilitate additional education for these 
workers, by paying unemployment insurance benefits to them while in 
school, for example, and permitting tuition tax credits for those train 
ing for jobs outside their current profession.
A final finding from these data is that workers who have advance 
notice of a closure do not appear to experience smaller financial losses
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than workers who are caught by surprise. One explanation is that even 
with advance notice, few workers leave prior to the plant closure. On 
ly 9 percent of prenotified workers left before their layoff. As expected, 
however, the prenotified early leavers experience the smallest finan 
cial losses. While prenotification may not improve incomes, it does give 
workers a chance to adjust expenditures in anticipation of a period of 
reduced income, and, as argued above, gives workers and communities 
an opportunity to explore the feasibility of a local plant buyout.
Directions for Further Research
The study of plant closure rates across regions and SMSAs has cast 
doubt on a number of assumptions about the causes of closures, but 
has provided little explanation of why plants close. Our ability to predict 
where and why a plant will close is still limited. Future research might 
focus on in-depth case studies of continuing and closing plants and 
develop alternate and testable hypotheses.
A second area for further study is to look at plant closure patterns, 
rates of job displacement, and the costs of layoff across industries rather 
than regions. Contrary to accepted wisdom, we found that plant closure 
rates in 4-digit industries were unaffected by the degree of import com 
petition and industry growth. This finding is limited, however, by the 
inclusion of only three 3-digit SIC code industries. Research which in 
cludes data on all industries and tests the hypotheses with other data 
sets can help establish the validity and generalizability of this result.
Analyses using all industries would also test our speculation that it 
isn't until an industry's start-ups and expansions are very low, that losses 
due to plant closures begin to increase and lead to further industrial 
decline. Moreover, we did not consider the probability of layoff by in 
dustry. While this study, combined with the results of the Brookings' 
studies, suggests that layoffs are as likely in declining as growing in 
dustries, this question cannot be carefully tested with the D&B data. 
The D&B data only allow us to determine whether there was a job loss 
and not whether that job loss is temporary or permanent.
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An across-industry study of the costs of displacement to workers is 
a third area for study with potential policy implications. For example, 
the results of such a study would be valuable in evaluating the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. TAA is designed to aid workers 
displaced by increased foreign competition; the benefits are cash 
payments made available after unemployment insurance expires. The 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, later modified in 1974 and 1981, deter 
mined that workers were eligible for benefits where imports made an 
important contribution to their separation from their jobs. The purpose 
of TAA is not only to buy political support for trade liberalization, but 
to assist workers believed to encounter the greatest reemployment bar 
riers. An explicit assumption in the TAA program is that workers in 
declining industries experience the largest losses from layoff, presumably 
because they are the most likely to be laid off or, if laid off, the least 
likely to find a comparable job.
Preliminary findings from this study indicate there is no simple rela 
tionship between industrial decline and layoffs. The question remains 
as to whether workers from declining industries experience larger finan 
cial losses because of limited reemployment opportunities. One 
hypothesis is that TAA is inequitable. Under TAA, a worker displaced 
from an industry exhibiting national growth but local decline is not eligi 
ble for assistance while a worker displaced from an industry exhibiting 
national decline but local growth is eligible. The former may face greater 
displacement losses and reemployment barriers than the latter, and yet 
is not eligible for TAA.
Evidence arguing against industry-specific programs is provided by 
Bendick and Devine (1981), who compared the length of the unemploy 
ment spell of workers displaced from declining industries with that of 
workers displaced from growing industries. They found that 12.1 per 
cent of workers who had previously worked in growing industries were 
still unemployed after 26 weeks, while only 10.7 percent of workers 
displaced from declining industries were still unemployed after 26 weeks. 
This pattern was reinforced with regression analysis, with the 
characteristics of workers held constant. Working in a declining industry 
had no statistically significant effect on the expected duration of 
unemployment. One explanation for this result may be that the length
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of the unemployment spell is more sensitive to local industry growth 
than national industry growth. This is an area for further work.
A fourth area for future research is in the study of dislocated workers 
who migrate. One shortcoming of the data analyzed in chapter 5 is that 
we could not determine where a dislocated worker who had moved liv 
ed prior to the relocation. Consequently, it was impossible to deter 
mine whether movers experienced smaller financial losses than stayers. 
Another related task is to identify the demographic and social 
characteristics of nonmovers in depressed labor markets. An answer 
to these questions will be helpful in determining whether financial con 
straints are a barrier to the migration of displaced workers and whether 
relocation assistance is likely to ease the adjustment for displaced 
workers.
A fifth and final direction for future research is to study the reemploy- 
ment experience of workers in nonmetropolitan labor markets. Because 
of the lack of information on the location of dislocated workers outside 
of SMSAs, these nonmetropolitan displaced workers had to be eliminated 
from this study. Data on the reemployment experience of workers 
displaced in what are probably less diversified economies will broaden 
our understanding of worker adjustments to job loss.
NOTE
1. See, for example, U.S. Congress (1983) the testimony by P.M. Lunni, Jr., Assistant Vice- 
President, Industrial Relations, National Association of Manufacturers, pp. 275-278.
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